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A	  SCHUMPETERIAN	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  THE	  CREDIT	  MARKET*	  
	  
1.	  	  Introduction	  Schumpeter's	  monetary	   theory	  gives	  great	   importance	  to	   the	  role	  of	  banks.	   It	  shows	  that	  bank	  credit	  acts	  as	  (money)-­‐capital	  and,	  therefore,	  constitutes	  the	  necessary	  premise	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  innovative	  processes	  planned	  by	  the	  entrepreneurs	  and	  their	  imitators.	  In	  a	  previous	   paper	   (Messori	   2004)	   I	   have	   examined	   the	   differences	   between	   this	   monetary	  approach	  which	  Schumpeter	   (1954)	  names	   'credit	   theory	  of	  money',	  and	  a	  more	   traditional	  approach	  labeled	  by	  the	  same	  author	  as	  'monetary	  theory	  of	  credit'.	  The	  differences	  between	  these	   two	   approaches	   have	   offered	   the	   opportunity	   for	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   time	  sequence	  which	   characterizes	   Schumpeter’s	   framework	   of	   the	   cyclical	   development.	   In	   this	  sequence,	   each	   production	   process	   takes	   time	   so	   that	   the	   purchase	   of	   productive	   inputs	  precede	   the	   sale	  of	  produced	  outputs;	   and	   this	   is	   the	   reason	  why	   credit	  matters	   and	  banks	  have	  a	  crucial	  role	  to	  play.	  However,	  in	  Messori	  (2004)	  I	  have	  not	  examined	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  debt	  contracts	  between	  banks	  and	  entrepreneurs	  (including	  imitators)	  during	  the	  two-­‐phase	  cycle.	  	  This	  is	  an	  analytical	  gap	  since	  Schumpeter's	  theory	  concerning	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  debt	  contracts	  between	  banks	  and	  innovative	  firms	  offers	  valuable	  hints	  and	  theoretical	  pieces	  in	  a	  field	   at	   length	   neglected	   by	   the	   economic	   theory,	   even	   by	   those	   approaches	   –	   mainly,	   the	  sequential	  schemes	  -­‐	  which	  explicitly	  deal	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  advance	  credit	  to	  open	  the	  markets	  of	  inputs	  and	  then	  to	  start	  the	  production	  processes.	  In	  this	  respect,	  examples	  are	  offered	  by	  Wicksell	  (1898),	  Robertson	  (1926),	  and	  Keynes	  (1930).	  In	  these	  outstanding	  works	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  functions	  in	  the	  credit	  market	  is	  oversimplified	  or	   exogenously	   given.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	  more	   recent	   sequential	   schemes.	   The	   	   analyses	  based	  on	  a	  single	  period	  (cf.	  Graziani	  1992),	  treat	  banks’	  supply	  as	  infinitely	  elastic	  and	  firms’	  demand	  for	  credit	  as	  given;	  and,	  despites	  the	  stimulating	  attempts	  made	  by	  Hicks	  (1989)	  and	  Amendola-­‐Gaffard	   (1998,	   ch.	   2),	   the	  neo-­‐Austrian	  multiperiods	  models	  of	  Hicks	   (1965)	   and	  Amendola-­‐Gaffard	   (1988	   and	   2006)	   are	   unable	   to	   incorporate	   banks’	   behavior	   in	   their	  analytical	   framework1.	  This	  prevents	  the	  sequential	  models	  to	   include	  in	  their	  more	  general	  scheme	  the	  results,	  reached	  in	  partial	  equilibrium,	  by	  the	  asymmetric	   information	  literature	  on	   the	   existence	   of	   financial	   intermediaries	   and	   on	   the	   working	   of	   the	   credit	   market	   (see	  
                                                            
(*) This paper was prepared for the Conference in honor of Mario Amendola, “Innovation, economic change, and 
policies. An out-of-equilibrium perspective”, held at the University of Rome ‘la Sapienza’ (17-19 November 2011). I 
would like to thank the participants to this Conferences as well as the colleagues who discussed drafts of this same 
paper in various Seminars for their helpful comments. I also greatly benefited by the comments of three referees.  
1 Hicks (1956) denominates the analysis offered by single-period models as “single-period theory”, and that offered by 
multiperiod models as “continuation theory”. He maintains that, even if the “single-period theory is a part, and indeed 
an essential part, of dynamic analysis”, “it needs to be completed by some form of continuation theory if it is to do its 
properly dynamic job of analyzing a process” (p. 223).  
 2 
Diamond	   1984,	   Gale-­‐Hellwig	   1985,	   Stiglitz-­‐Weiss	   1981	   and	   1992,	   Innes	   1991;	   and	   for	   an	  analytical	  review:	  Freixas-­‐Rochet	  1997).	  	  The	  present	  paper	  aims	   to	  build	  up	  a	  Schumpeterian	  debt	  contract	   to	  be	   integrated	  with	  the	   just	   mentioned	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   played	   by	   banks.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	  Schumpeter’s	   approach	   leaves	   many	   problems	   unsolved	   as	   regard	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  objective-­‐function	  of	   the	   individual	  banks,	   to	   the	  determination	  of	   the	   interest	   rates,	   and	   to	  the	  usableness	  of	  the	  credit	  demand	  and	  supply	  curves.	  Hence,	  at	  first	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  point	  out	  the	  main	  weaknesses	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  debt	  contracts	  signed	  by	  savers	  and	  innovators,	  and	  to	  suggest	  some	  solutions	  to	  these	  weaknesses	  in	  a	  Schumpeterian	  sequential	  framework.	  Then	  Schumpeter’s	  assumptions	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  lending	  banks	  must	  be	  fitted	  into	   this	   sequential	   framework,	   and	   the	   consequent	   determination	   of	   the	   credit	   market	  equilibria	  must	  be	  refined	  in	  a	  Schumpeterian	  vein.	  My	  sequential	  model	  is	  characterized	  by	  three	  periods:	  the	  first	  represents	  a	  stationary	  state,	  the	  second	  allows	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  innovative	  process,	  and	  the	  third	  marks	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  new	  output	  on	  the	  market.	  My	  analysis	  of	  the	  credit	  market	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  debt	  contracts	  signed	  at	  the	  opening	  phase	  of	  the	  second	  and	  third	  period.	  The	  remaining	  parts	  of	  this	  paper	  are	  organized	  as	  follow.	  I	  first	  investigate	  the	  drawbacks	  raised	   by	   Schumpeter’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   market	   relations	   between	   capitalists	   and	  entrepreneurs	  (section	  2),	  and	  I	  outline	  possible	   improvements	  (section	  3).	   I	   then	  point	  out	  the	   changes	   required	   by	   the	   substitution	   of	   banks	   for	   capitalists	   (section	   4),	   and	   I	   refine	  Schumpeter’s	   analysis	   of	   bank	   behavior	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   temporay	   equilibria	   in	   the	  credit	  market	   (section	  5).	  This	   last	  step	  shows	   that	  a	  Schumpeterian	  approach	   to	   the	  credit	  market	  is	  robust	  to	  the	  criticism	  raised	  by	  Schumpeter	  himself	  (section	  6),	  and	  highlights	  the	  important	  contribution	   that	   this	  approach	  could	  give	  as	  a	  precursor	  of	   the	   literature	  on	   the	  debt	  contracts	  design	  with	  asymmetric	  information	  (section	  7).	  A	  point	  to	  be	  stressed	  is	  that,	  differently	  from	  what	  has	  been	  stated	  by	  many	  critics,	  Das	  Wesen	  des	  Geldes	  and	  -­‐	  in	  general	  -­‐	  the	  Theory	  of	  money	  and	  banking2	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  this	  contribution.	  	  
2.	  	  Interest	  rate	  in	  Schumpeter’s	  monetary	  market	  Schumpeter’s	  economic	  process	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  exchanges	  characterized	  by	  a	  time	  lag	  between	  the	  instant	  in	  which	  the	  producers	  purchase	  the	  desired	  inputs	  through	  the	  payment	  of	  money	  wages,	  and	  the	   instant	   in	  which	  they	  realize	  monetary	  proceeds	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  final	  goods	  obtained	  utilizing	  those	  previously	  acquired	  inputs3.	  This	  time	  lag	  
                                                            
2 For reasons explained in Messori (1997), under this latter title I mean not only the twelve chapters included in 
Schumpeter’ treatise on money (Schumpeter 1970), but also four typescripts which are written in German and most 
likely represent chapters XIII, XIV and XV of this  treatise. I found the four typescripts in the Harvard University 
Archives under Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, and I published them for the first time in an Italian edition (see Schumpeter 
1996, first part).  
3 Schumpeter (e.g.: 1912, ch.1) follows the Austrian representation of vertically integrated production processes and 
affirms that there are two productive factors: labor services and land services. In this paper I only refer to the labor 
 3 
between	   the	   purchase	   of	   inputs	   and	   the	   sale	   of	   outputs	   can	   be	   neglected	   in	   the	   stationary	  state,	  since	  the	  unchanging	  reproduction	  of	  the	  economic	  process	  period	  after	  period	  allows	  for	  the	  sincronization	  of	  the	  exchanges	  (cf.	  Schumpeter	  1970,	  pp.	  113-­‐16).	  Vice	  versa,	   in	  the	  cyclical	  development,	   this	   same	   time	   lag	   implies	   that	   the	  entrepreneurs	  as	   innovators	   (and,	  even	  if	  for	  a	  smaller	  amount,	  their	  imitators)	  need	  an	  external	  financing	  in	  order	  to	  hire	  that	  amount	   of	   labor	   services	   which	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   innovative	   (or	  imitative)	  production	  processes.	  Following	  Schumpeter,	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  mostly	  assume	  that	  the	  only	  possible	  source	  of	  external	  financing	  is	  bank	  credit.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  I	  mainly	  examine	  how	  the	  debt	  contracts	  between	  banks	  and	  entrepreneurs	  are	  drawn	  up	  and	  how	  a	  temporary	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  credit	  market	  can	  be	  reached4.	  In	  the	  Schumpeterian	  framework	  each	  debt	  contract	  between	  lending	  banks	  and	  borrowing	  entrepreneurs	  is	  characterized	  by	  two	  variables:	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  loan	  granted,	  and	  the	  level	  of	   the	   interest	   rate	   (see	   also	   below,	   n.	   6).	   The	   definition	   of	  money	   as	   capital,	   the	   lack	   of	   a	  capital	   market	   and	   of	   a	   positive	   interest	   rate	   in	   the	   stationary	   state,	   and	   my	   arbitrary	  exclusion	  of	  land	  services	  imply	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  bank	  financing	  to	  new	  innovative	  firms	  is	  equal	   to	   the	   amount	   of	   money	   wages	   to	   be	   paid	   by	   these	   firms	   in	   order	   to	   purchase	   that	  amount	   of	   labor	   services	   necessary	   to	   start	   and	   complete	   their	   innovative	   activities.	   These	  definitions	  and	  assumptions	  also	  imply	  that	  Schumpeter’s	  interest	  rate	  is	  a	  purely	  monetary	  variable	  determined	  in	  the	  monetary	  (or	  credit)	  market5.	  In	  particular,	  being	  the	  premium	  of	  the	  present	  over	  the	  future	  purchasing	  power,	  the	  interest	  rate	  represents	  the	  cost	  that	  each	  innovator	  (or	  imitator)	  has	  to	  bear	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  her	  desired	  new	  production	  process	  and	  to	  obtain	   the	   related	   advantages	   in	   terms	  of	   lucro	   captando	   (or	  damno	   evitando).	   It	   follows	  that	  interest	  is	  the	  “price	  of	  	  purchasing	  power”,	  “originates	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  entrepreneur”,	  and	  appears	  as	  a	  “tax”	  on	  her	  gross	  profits	  (cf.	  Schumpeter	  1912,	  pp.	  273-­‐74,	  317,	  259-­‐62	  and	  203;	  Eng.	  trans.,	  pp.	  182-­‐4,	  210,	  173-­‐5	  and	  125;	  see	  also:	  1939,	  pp.123-­‐6;	  1970,	  pp.299-­‐300).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  by	  creating	  ex	  novo	   those	   'claims'	  on	  money	  which	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  financing	   of	   innovations,	   banks	   take	   upon	   themselves	   the	  whole	   risk	   of	   possible	   default	   of	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
services because the analysis of the land services would require further qualifications.  Moreover, I am assuming that 
the labor units are homogeneous.    
4 It should be noted that I do not analyze in a detailed way the different forms taken by bank financing and the various 
possibilities to transform short-term bank credits into securities placed in the capital market (see Schumpeter 1970, pp. 
176-89; see also: Schumpeter 1912, pp. 159-61; Engl. trans., pp. 111-12). Furthermore, it ought to be remembered that, 
in Schumpeter’s framework, the credit market and the security (or financial) market are not separated markets since the 
latter is reduced to a section of the former (cf. Schumpeter 1939, pp. 113-4, 618, and 621; 1970, pp. 315-18). Finally it 
should be noted that, in order not to complicate matters, from now on I will use the term entrepreneur for indicating 
both the innovators and the imitators.     
5 It is evident that the monetary determination of Schumpeter’s interest rate depends on the lack of a positive interest 
rate in the stationary state. Many critics have considered the latter point as one of the most controversial results of 
Schumpeter’s analysis. However, Samuelson (1982) offers a possible rationale for Schumpeter’s position.     
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each	  applicant	   to	  whom	   they	  grant	   loans6.	  Therefore,	   banks	   consider	   interests	   as	  being	   the	  refund	  for	  such	  a	  risk.	  	  	  Let	  assume	  that	  n	  risk-­‐neutral	  entrepreneurs	  enter	  into	  the	  stationary	  economic	  process	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  period	   t.	  Given	   that	   the	  Schumpeterian	   innovations	   imply	  a	   lengthening	  of	  the	  new	  production	  processes,	  the	  innovative	  firm	  of	  the	  entrepreneur	  i	  (i	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  n)	  must	  obtain	   loans	   to	   start	   its	   new	   activity	   as	   well	   as	   to	   complete	   it7.	   The	   demand	   for	   loans	   of	  entrepreneur	   i	   is	   addressed	   to	   a	   representative	   lender8.	   Schumpeter	   maintains	   that	   the	  productive	  units	  of	  the	  stationary	  state	  have	  a	  standard	  production	  function:	  𝑄!! =	  Q	  (𝑁!!)	  	  	  	  with	  	  	  !!!!!!!! > 0, and     !!!!!!!!!! < 0                                                                                                                                                                             1 ;	  whereas	   the	   firm	   of	   entrepreneur	   i	   has	   a	   production	   function	   characterized	   by	   a	   new	  technology,	  that	  is:	  𝑄!!!! = 𝑄  (𝑁!! ,𝑁!!!! ,	  𝐴!!!! )	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!!!!!!! 	  >	  0,	  !!!!!!!!!!!! 	  >	  0,	  !!!!!!!!!!!!! < 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2);	  	  where	   the	   symbols	   denote:	  Qss	   the	   amount	   of	   the	   final	   good	   produced	   by	   a	   representative	  productive	  unit	  operating	   in	   the	  stationary	  state,	  Nss	   the	  quantity	  of	   labor	  employed	  by	   this	  same	  unit,	  Qit+1	  	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  final	  good	  produced	  by	  entrepreneur	  i	  after	  two	  periods,	  Nit	  and	  Nit+1	  the	  quantity	  of	  labor	  employed	  by	  this	  same	  entrepreneur	  –	  respectively	  –	  in	  the	  first	  and	   second	   production	   period9,	  Ait+1	   the	   new	   state	   of	   technology	  made	   ready	   at	   the	   end	   of	  period	  t	  by	  means	  of	  Nit	  .	  	  Equations	   (1)	  and	  (2)	   imply	   that,	   if	  Nss	  =	  Ni,	   it	  will	  hold:	  𝑄!!!! > 2  𝑄𝑠𝑠.	  Hence,	   innovation	  determines	  an	  upward	  shift	  of	   the	  production	   function	  without	  any	  significant	  change	   in	   its	  shape,	   that	   is,	   it	   determines	   an	   increase	   in	   labor	   productivity	   without	   eliminating	   the	  decreasing	  function	  of	  marginal	  labor	  productivity.	  In	  the	  stationary	  state	  productive	  units	  do	  
                                                            
6 Cf. e.g.: Schumpeter 1912, p. 217; Eng. trans., p. 137 (and also p. 75 n.); 1939, p. 104 and n. It is well known that 
banks may share the risk with borrowers by including "collaterals" into the debt contracts. Schumpeter (1912, pp. 146-
47; Engl. trans., pp. 100-1) examines this possibility. However, since the entrepreneur does not act in the stationary 
state, Schumpeter cannot assume that the function of innovators is dependent on the holding of wealth. On the other 
hand, to raise a mortgage on the final goods produced by means of innovative processes can guarantee banks vis-à-vis 
ex-post 'dishonest' behavior by entrepreneurs, but it does not eliminate the risk of their possible default. As a 
consequence, in Schumpeter’s framework, the payment of interests to banks could also be interpreted in terms of 
'property rights' (see: Swoboda 1984, pp. 27-8). For sake of simplicity, here I do not address these problems. This 
justifies my previous statement that the Schumpeterian debt contract has two dimensions: the level of the interest rate 
and the amount of financing.     
7 Cf.	  Schumpeter	  1939,	  p.	  93.	  The	  Schumpeterian	  framework	  is	  based	  on	  a	  discrete	  time	  sequence	  which	  allows	  to	  isolate	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  debt	  contracts	  in	  the	  credit	  market,	  and	  hence	  hinders	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  continuous	  time	  dynamics.	  Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, I assume here that each innovative production process ends after 
two periods. This last assumption implies that financing of each innovation requires a two-periods debt contract (at the 
opening of t) as well as a one-period debt contract (at the opening of t+1). In the following I will unite these two 
contracts by means of some simplifications. 
8 In the Schumpeterian system there are a number of competing lenders. However, for analytical reasons which will 
become clearer below, I temporarily assume that all the lenders have the same costs and information structure and hence 
a symmetric behavior. These assumptions will be dropped analyzing Schumpeter’s supply function of financing.   
9 For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that Nit	  =	  Nit+1	  =	  Ni. 
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realize	   neither	   profits	   nor	   losses.	   At	   the	   opposite,	   due	   to	   the	   the	   productive	   impact	   of	  innovation,	   entrepreneurs	   have	   a	   positive	   expected	   profit.	   Thus,	   Schumpeter	   can	   state	   that	  the	  demand	  for	  financing	  made	  by	  each	  entrepreneur	  depends	  on	  her	  profit	  expectations	  and	  the	   level	   of	   the	   interest	   rate:	   entrepreneur	   i	   finds	   it	   convenient	   to	   apply	   for	   the	   amount	   of	  financing	  which	  would	  allow	  her	  to	  realize	  that	  level	  of	  final	  good	  which,	  at	  the	  margin,	  makes	  the	   rate	   of	   her	   expected	  monetary	   profit	   –	   gross	   of	   financial	   charges	   –	   equal	   to	   the	  money	  interest	   rate.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Schumpeter	   can	   state	   that	   the	   loan	   supplied	   by	   the	  representative	  lender	  to	  a	  given	  borrower	  depends	  on	  the	  interest	  rate,	  the	  borrower’s	  risk	  of	  default	  expected	  by	  the	  same	  lender,	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  supplying	  this	  loan.	  	  The	   above	   analysis	   is	   important	   for	   determining	   the	   debt	   contracts	   between	   a	  representative	   lender	  and	  an	   innovative	   firm	  as	  well	  as	   their	  supply	  and	  demand	   functions.	  For	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity,	   let	   assume	   that	   the	   innovative	   production	   function	   is	   common	  knowledge	  and	  that	   the	  expected	  market	  prices	  of	   the	   final	  good	  are	  given.	  Let	  also	  assume	  that	  each	  debt	  contract	  is	  a	  standard	  one,	  that	  is,	  at	  the	  expiring	  date	  the	  lender	  will	  collect	  the	  principal	  and	  the	  interests	  set	  by	  this	  contract,	  if	  the	  innovative	  firm	  is	  solvent,	  or	  the	  whole	  proceeds	   of	   the	   activity	   financed,	   if	   the	   innovative	   firm	   defaults.	   Remember	   that	   the	   debt	  contracts	  must	   finance	  a	  double	  purchase	  of	   that	  amount	  of	   labor	  services	  required	  to	  start	  and	   realize	   the	   innovative	   process:	   the	   first	   debt	   contract	   ends	   after	   the	   double	   time	   lag	  elapsing	  between	  entrepreneur’s	  first	  purchase	  of	  inputs	  and	  entrepreneur’s	  sale	  of	  the	  final	  good,	  whereas	  the	  second	  debt	  contract	  lasts	  the	  period	  t+1.	  Let	  assume	  that	  both	  contracts	  are	  set	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  period	   t;	   referring	   to	  a	  given	   innovative	  process,	   their	   terms	  are	  thus	   the	   same.	   Denoting	  with	   Lit	   and	   Lit+1	   the	   loans	   actually	   granted	   by	   the	   representative	  lender	  to	  entrepreneur	  i	  –	  respectively	  –	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  first	  and	  of	  the	  second	  period	  of	  her	  innovative	  process	  and	  remembering	  that	  Lit	  =	  Lit+1	  =	  Li	  (see	  n.	  9),	  we	  have:	  𝐿!! 	  =	  𝐿!  (𝑟! ,𝜌!!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!    	  <	  0;	  	  !!!!!!   > 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  𝐿!! 	  =	  𝐿!	  (𝑟! ,𝜎! , 𝑐!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!    	  >	  0;	  	  !!!!!! < 0;     !!!!!! 	  <	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4)	  𝜌! = 𝐸 max[𝑋!(2𝐿!)− ( 1+ 𝑟! + (1+ 𝑟!)!)  𝐿! ; 0] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (5)	  𝜋! = 𝐸 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((1+ 𝑟!)+   1+ 𝑟! !)  𝐿!;   𝑋′!(2𝐿! ,𝜎!) −   (1+ 𝑐!)2  𝐿! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (6);	  where	   the	   symbols	   denote:	   LiD	   and	   LiS	   	   –	   respectively	   –	   the	   total	   demand	   for	   loans	   of	  entrepreneur	   i	   	   to	  the	  representative	  lender	  and	  the	  total	  supply	  of	  loans	  of	  the	  latter	  to	  the	  former,	   ri	   the	   interest	  rate	  on	  the	  debt	  contracts,	  ρgi	  and	  ρi	   the	  expected	  monetary	  profits	  of	  entrepreneur	  i	  –	  respectively	  –	  before-­‐	  and	  after-­‐interests	  payment,	  Xi	  and	  X’i	  –	  respectively	  –	  her	  expected	  monetary	  proceeds	  and	  her	  monetary	  proceeds	  expected	  by	  the	  representative	  lender,	   πi	   the	   net	   return	   expected	   by	   the	   representative	   lender	   on	   the	   financing	   of	  entrepreneur	  i,	  σi	  the	  i’s	  risk	  of	  default	  expected	  by	  the	  same	  lender,	  ci	  the	  unitary	  cost	  related	  to	  this	  loan.	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As	  in	  the	  standard	  analysis,	  equations	  (3)	  and	  (5)	  can	  be	  graphed	  by	  means	  of	  a	  demand	  curve	   for	   financing	  of	   each	   individual	   entrepreneur	  which	   is	  decreasing	   in	   the	   interest	   rate	  and	  parametric	  to	  her	  expected	  rate	  of	  gross	  monetary	  profit,	  and	  equations	  (4)	  and	  (6)	  can	  be	   graphed	   by	   means	   of	   a	   supply	   curve	   of	   financing	   of	   the	   representative	   lender	   to	   an	  individual	   entrepreneur	  which	   is	   increasing	   in	   the	   interest	   rate	   and	   parametric	   to	   lender’s	  expectation	  on	  this	  entrepreneur’s	  default	  risk	  and	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  loan.	  At	  the	  equilibrium,	  𝐿!! 	  =	  𝐿!! 	  =	  2Li	  	  ≡	  (Lit	  +	  Lit+1)	  
It is well known that Schumpeter refuses the method of aggregates (see for instance: 1935, p. 
136; 1936, pp. 154-5;  1939, pp. 43-4; 1946, p. 210; 1970, p. 269). However, in order to determine 
the actual amount of financing compatible with the equilibrium in the monetary (or credit) market, 
the author has to build	  the	  function	  of	  the	  total	  demand	  for	  financing	  made	  by	  the	  whole	  set	  of	  n	  entrepreneurs	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   periods	   t	  and	   t+1	  and	   the	   function	  of	   the	   total	   supply	   of	  financing	  made	  by	  the	  whole	  set	  of	  lenders.	  	  	  Let	   start	  with	   the	   total	   demand	   function.	   Schumpeter	   (1912)	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   this	  function	   is	   just	   the	   aggregation	   of	   the	   individual	   demand	   functions	  made	   by	   each	   of	   the	   n	  entrepreneurs.	  Hence,	  given	  equation	  (3),	  we	  would	  have:	  𝐿! = 𝐿!!!!!! .	  Moreover,	  the	  author	  adds	  that	  all	   the	  points	  of	   the	  related	  demand	  curve	  must	  equalize	  the	   interest	  rate	  and	  the	  marginal	  profit	  rate	  expected	  by	  the	  "last	  entrepreneur"10.	  It	  results:	  𝐿! = 𝐿!  (𝑟! ,𝜌!!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!    	  <	  0;	  	  !!!!!!   > 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (7)	  	  𝜌!!	  (2  𝐿!)	  =	  rl	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (8);	  where	  the	  suffix	  l	  denotes	  that	  the	  variable	  refers	  to	  the	  “last	  entrepreneur”.	  As	  to	  the	  supply	  function,	  Schumpeter	  starts	  from	  a	  simplified	  case,	  that	  is,	  the	  “exchange	  between	  entrepreneurs	   and	   capitalists”	   in	   the	  monetary	  market.	  However,	   the	   author	  must	  face	   a	   double	   problem	   of	   aggregation	   since	   he	   replaces	   the	   representative	   lender	   with	  m	  savers	   playing	   the	   role	   of	   capitalists11.	   Schumpeter	   has	   thus	   to	   build	   the	   microeconomic	  supply	  function	  of	  capitalist	  j	  (with	  j	  =	  1,2,…,	  m)	  towards	  the	  whole	  subset	  of	  his	  borrowers,	  and	   then	   the	   total	   supply	   function	   of	   all	   the	  m	   capitalists	   towards	   the	   whole	   set	   of	   the	   n	  entrepreneurs.	  He	  maintains	  that	  the	  points	  of	  the	  supply	  curve	  of	  capitalist	  j	  must	  make	  his	  expected	  marginal	  utility	  equal	  to	  his	  marginal	  sacrifice	  which	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  his	  rate	  
                                                            
10 In Schumpeter's words (1912, p. 292; Engl. trans., pp. 193-94), the "last entrepreneur" can be defined as being the 
entrepreneur with the lowest marginal profit rate which is expected from the innovative project, that is, as being "the 
one who anticipates from carrying out his project a profit which just makes the interest payment possible".   
11 Cf. Schumpeter 1912, pp. 288-99; Engl. trans., pp. 191-98. It should be noted that Schumpeter's capitalist may only 
transfer to entrepreneurs an amount of means of payment already circulating in the stationary state. This means that, 
whilst Schumpeter’s banker creates means of payment, Schumpeter’s capitalist can play, at the most, a function of 
financial intermediation between savers and entrepreneurs. However, in this last respect, I do not separate capitalists 
and savers; hence, the former do not bear a direct cost to have the availability of means of payment to lend. My 
following reconstruction does not aim to reach a philological accuracy but to rationalize the meaning of Schumpeter's 
analysis. This reconstruction also neglects to assess the degree of (in)compatibility between the role played by 
capitalists and the working of the stationary state. 
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of	  discount	  (δj);	   then,	  he	  adds	  that	  all	   the	  points	  of	   the	  total	  supply	  curve	  must	  equalize	  the	  interest	  rate	  (net	  of	  the	  expected	  marginal	  default	  rate)	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  discount	  of	  the	  "last	  capitalist"12.	  Hence,	  given	  equation	  (4),	  we	  would	  have:	  𝐿!! =    𝐿!!!! !!	  =	  𝐿!(𝑟! ,𝜎! ,  δjh),	  where	  v	  (v	  ≤	  n)	   is	   the	   subset	   of	   the	  n	  entrepreneurs	  who	  borrow	   from	   capitalist	   j	   (h=1,2,…,	  v);	   and	  𝐿! =    𝐿!!!!!!   .	  It	  results:	  𝐿! =   𝐿!	  (𝑟! ,𝜎! ,	  𝛿!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!    	  >	  0;	  	  !!!!!! < 0;	  	  !!!!!! 	  <	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (9)	  𝑟! − 𝜎! = 𝛿! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (10);	  where	  the	  suffix	  l	  denotes	  that	  the	  variable	  refers	  to	  the	  “last	  capitalist”.	  According	  to	  the	  author	  (Schumpeter	  1912,	  pp.	  203	  and	  295-­‐97;	  Engl.	  trans.,	  pp.	  125	  and	  193-­‐95),	   (7)-­‐(8)	   and	   (9)-­‐(10)	   lead	   to	   the	   determination	   of	   that	   level	   of	   the	   equilibrium	  interest	  rate	  (r*)	  which	  guarantees	  the	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  monetary	  market.	  We	  would	  have:	  𝐿!  (𝑟! ,𝜌!!)	  =	  𝐿!	  (𝑟! ,𝜎! , 𝛿!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (11)	  𝜌!!	  (2  𝐿!)	  = 𝛿! + 𝜎! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (12).	  	  
3.	  	  A	  refinement	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  	  Equations	   (11)	   and	   (12)	   synthetize	   Schumpeter’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   exchange	   between	  capitalists	   and	   entrepreneurs	   in	   the	   monetary	   market.	   This	   analysis,	   which	   determines	   a	  single	   equilibrium	   interest	   rate	   in	   the	  monetary	  market,	   can	  be	  questioned	  at	   least	   for	   two	  reasons	  (see	  also	  Messori	  1986,	  secs.	  2	  and	  3):	  (a)	  the	  curves	  of	  the	  total	  demand	  and	  supply	  of	   loans	   are	   not	   homogeneous,	   and	   (b)	   the	   supply	   behavior	   of	   capitalists	   is	   not	   thoroughly	  specified.	  	  Concerning	  (a),	   it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  total	  supply	  curve	  of	  loans	  is	  increasing	  in	  the	  interest	   rate	  mainly	   because	   it	   is	   based	   on	   a	   'descriptive'	   ordering,	   i.e.	   capitalists	   rank	   and	  'serve'	  their	  borrowers	  according	  to	  their	  expected	  increasing	  default	  risk.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  that	  such	  a	  descriptive	  ordering,	  which	  leads	  to	  ‘spurious’	  margins	  (see	  Sraffa	  1960),	  should	  correspond	   to	   the	   functional	   ordering	   at	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   total	   demand	   curve	   for	   financing,	  which	   leads	   to	   ‘pure’	   margins.	   It	   could	   easily	   happen	   that,	   at	   Schumpeter’s	   supposed	  equilibrium	  interest	  rate,	  a	  subset	  of	  entrepreneurs	  has	  a	  positive	  demand	  for	   financing	  but	  each	   capitalist	   is	   ready	   to	   ‘serve’	   them	   only	   at	   interest	   rates	   higher	   than	   their	   reservation	  level.	   Concerning	   (b),	   it	   ought	   to	   be	   remembered	   that	   capitalists	   can	   only	   offer	   –	   by	  assumption	  (see	  n.	  11)	  –	  the	  already	  existing	  amount	  of	  their	  savings,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  order	  the	  different	  borrowers	  according	  to	  the	  (expected)	  default	  risk	  subjectively	  attributed	  
                                                            
12 The marginal sacrifice, measured by the rate of discount, represents the cost of loans borne by the capitalist. Hence, 
δj is a specification of the generic unitary cost c in equation (3). Analogously to the “last entrepreneur” (see footnote 
10), the “last capitalist” can be defined as being the capitalist with an interest rate (net of the expected default rate) on 
his marginal loan which just equalizes his discount rate.    
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to	  them.	  The	  former	  hypothesis	  implies	  that	  the	  last	  part	  of	  the	  total	  supply	  curve	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  could	  be	   infinitely	  rigid,	   the	   latter	  hypothesis	  offers	   to	  capitalists	   the	  possibility	  of	  realizing	   a	   profitable	   price	   discrimination	   of	   their	   borrowers.	   Schumpeter	   overlooks	   both	  these	  points.	  	  The	   analytical	   solution	  of	   the	  problems,	   raised	  by	  points	   (a)	   and	   (b),	  makes	   it	   necessary	  that	  each	  capitalist	  offers	  separating	  debt	  contracts	  to	  his	  potential	  borrowers	  with	  different	  expected	  profits	  and	  risks	  of	  default.	  I	  previously	  indicated	  the	  subset	  of	  the	  n	  entrepreneurs	  who	  can	  borrow	  from	  capitalist	  j	  (j	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  m)	  as	  the	  subset	  v	  (with	  h=1,2,…,	  v).	  Hence,	  it	  is	  convenient	  for	  capitalist	  j	  to	  group	  his	  v	  potential	  borrowers	  in	  Ω	  risk	  classes	  (Ω	  ≤	  v),	  each	  of	  them	  composed	  by	  borrowers	  with	  the	  same	  expected	  profit	  and	  risk	  of	  default.	  Let	  assimilate	  the	  choices	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  capitalists	   to	   the	  behavior	  of	  a	   traditional	   saver	  under	  risk.	  Let	  also	   assume	   that	   Schumpeter’s	   capitalists	   are	   risk-­‐averse	   due	   to	   their	   limited	   amount	   of	  wealth.	  Hence	  capitalist	  j	  aims	  to	  solve	  the	  following	  intertemporal	  optimization	  problem:	  
)1(
)(






+ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (13)	  
s.t.	  	  p1Cj1	  ≤	  Sj	  -­‐	  𝐿! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (14)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  p2	  Cj2	  	  ≤	  {(1	  –	  σ1)	  Lj1	  [(1+	  rj1)+(1	  +	  rj1)2]	  +	  σ1	  X1	  +	  (1	  –	  σ2)	  Lj2	  [(1	  +	  rj2)+(1	  +	  rj2)2]	  +	  σ2	  X2	  +…+	  (1	  –	  σk)	  Ljk	  [(1	  +	  rjk)+(1	  +	  rjk)2]	  +	  σk	  Xk	  +…+	  (1	  –	  σΩ)	  LjΩ	  [(1	  +	  rjΩ)+(1	  +	  rjΩ)2]	  +	  σΩ	  XΩ	  +	  [(Sj	  -­‐	  2𝐿!)	  -­‐	  
p1	  Cj1]	  –	   𝑐!Ω!!! 2𝐿!! }	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (15)	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑆!   ≥ 2𝐿! 	  	  ≡	  	  2𝐿!! +   2𝐿!!+. . .+2𝐿!!+. . .+  2𝐿Ω! 	  =	   2𝐿!!Ω!!! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (16);	  where:	  Cj1	  and	  Cj2	  denote	   the	   consumption	  of	   capitalist	   j	  after	   –	   respectively	   –	   one	   and	   two	  time	  lags,	  p1	  and	  p2	  the	  related	  prices,	  δj	  the	  discount	  rate	  of	  capitalist	  j,	  Sj	  his	  initial	  amount	  of	  wealth,	  	  𝐿! 	  the	  financing	  by	  this	  same	  capitalist	  of	  the	  whole	  set	  of	  his	  potential	  borrowers,  𝐿!! 	  his	  financing	  of	  the	  whole	  subset	  of	  his	  potential	  borrowers	  in	  the	  k	  risk	  class	  (where	  k=1,2,…,	  Ω),	  rjk	  and	  σjk.	  –	  respectively	  –	  the	  interest	  rates	  and	  the	  expected	  default	  rates	  on	  the	  k	  risk	  class,	  ck	   the	  unitary	  cost	  related	   to	   the	  supplies	  of	   loans	   to	   the	  k	   risk	  class,	  Xk	   the	  monetary	  proceeds	  of	  the	  k	  risk	  classes	  cashed	  by	  capitalist	  j	  in	  case	  of	  total	  default13.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  constraints	  (14),	  (15)	  and	  (16)	  are	  binding	  and	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  concave	   and	   twice	   differentiable	   utility	   function	   of	   capitalist	   j,	   the	   maximization	   problem	  (13)-­‐(16)	  has	   an	  analytical	   solution.	  However,	   in	  order	   to	   stress	   some	  points	  which	  will	   be	  useful	  in	  examining	  bank’s	  behavior	  (see	  below,	  sec.	  4),	  let	  me	  introduce	  some	  simplifications	  and	  have	  recourse	  to	  a	  graphic	  solution14.	  	  
                                                            
13 The definition of  Xk	  shows	  that	  the	  economic	  meaning	  of	  this	  symbol	  cannot	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  economic	  meanings	  of	  the	  symbols	  Xi	  and	  X’i	  as	  stated	  above. 
14 Let recall that the paper is focusing on the relationship between banks and entrepreneurs. Hence, the analysis of 
capitalists’ behavior in the monetary market is instrumental to the analysis of  banks’ behavior in the credit market. 
 9 
Let	  me	  reduce	  the	  Ω	  risk	  classes	  to	  two	  (class	  1	  and	  class	  2;	  where	  σ1	  <	  σ2),	  and	  assume	  that	  capitalist	  j	  will	  have	  a	  return	  equal	  to	  zero	  on	  the	  loans	  to	  borrowers	  in	  default	  (that	  is,	  Xi	  =	  0).	  These	  two	  simplifications	  imply	  that	  the	  constraint	  (15)	  becomes15:	  
p2	  C2	  	  =	  (1	  –	  σ1)	  L1	  [(1	  +	  r1)+(1	  +	  r1)2]	  –	  c12L1	  +	  (1	  –	  σ2)	  L2	  [(1	  +	  r2)+(1	  +	  r2)2]	  	  +	  [(S	  –	  2L)	  –	  p1C1]	  –	  c22L2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (15	  bis).	  In	  its	  turn,	  (15	  bis)	  implies	  that	  the	  utility-­‐maximizing	  risk	  averse	  capitalist	  j	  will	  be	  ready	  to	  finance	  both	  subsets	  of	  his	  potential	  borrowers,	   included	   in	   the	  two	  different	  risk	  classes,	   if	  and	  only	  if:	  (1	  –	  σ1)	  [(1	  +	  r1)+(1	  +	  r1)2]	  <	  (1	  –	  σ2)	  [(1	  +	  r2)+(1	  +	  r2)2]	  –	  2	  (c2	  –	  c1)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (17);	  Putting	  α	  =	   1− 𝜎!,	  β	  =	   1− 𝜎!,	  and	  	  ∆	  c	  =	   !(!!!  !!)!!!!    , equation	  (17)	  can	  be	  re-­‐written	  as:	  𝑟!	  >	  !  !  !! 	  +	  !!	  𝑟! +   ∆  𝑐	  that  is,putting  𝛳 =   !  !  !!   and  Ὑ =    !!    , as:	  𝑟! >  ϴ	  +	  Ὑ	  𝑟!+	  ∆  𝑐            	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (17	  bis).	  The	   assimilation	   of	   ck	   to	   capitalist	   j’s	   discount	   rate	   (δj;	   cf.	   n.	   12	   above)	   and	   capitalists’	   risk	  aversion	  suggest	  that	  ck	  is	  increasing	  in	  𝐿!"! 	  so	  that	  ∆	  c	  >	  0.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  r1,	  r2	  ≥	  0	  and	  that	  α,	  β	  ≥	  0	  and	  β	  <	  α	   (due	  to	   the	   fact	   that	  σ1,	  σ2	  ≤	  1	  and	  σ1	  <	  σ2),	  𝛳 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  Ὑ > 1.  Hence,	  equation	   (17	   bis)	   implies	   that	   r2	   >	   r1;	   and	   in	   the	   extreme	   case	   where	   the	   first	   class	   of	  borrowers	  is	  risk-­‐free	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  lending	  are	  zero	  so	  that	  r1	  =	  0,	  	  it	  implies	  that	  r2	  >	  !  !  !! .	  These	  results	  lead	  to	  a	  graphic	  solution	  of	  the	  maximization	  problem	  (13)	  –	  (16).	  Equation	  (3)	   allows	   to	   write	   the	   demands	   for	   loans	   of	   the	   entrepreneurs	   who	   are	   the	   potential	  borrowers	  of	  	  capitalist	  j	  (that	  is,	  the	  subset	  v,	  with	  v	  ≤	  n:	  see	  above)	  and	  are	  included	  by	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  risk	  classes	  1	  and	  2.	  These	  two	  demands	  are,	  respectively:	  𝐿!!  =   𝐿!!!!!!!! 	  =   𝐿!  (𝑟!,𝜌!!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!!   	  <	  0;	    !!!!!!! > 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3a)	  𝐿!!=	     𝐿!!!! =!!!!!!!! 𝐿!  (𝑟!,𝜌!!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  !!!!!!!     	  <	  0;	  	  !!!!!!!   > 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3b).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  equation	  (4)	  allows	  to	  write	  the	  supplies	  of	  loans	  of	  this	  same	  capitalist	  j	  to	  the	  subset	  v	  of	  his	  potential	  borrowers	  grouped	  in	  the	  risk	  classes	  1	  and	  2.	  These	  two	  supplies	  (𝐿!!! 	  and	  𝐿!!! 	  where	  𝐿!! = 𝐿!!! +   𝐿!!! )	  	  are,	  respectively:	  𝐿!!! 	  =	   𝐿!!!!!!!! = 𝐿!	  (𝑟!,𝜎!, 𝑐!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  	  !!!!!!!     	  >	  0;	  	  !!!!!!! < 0;     !!!!!!! 	  <	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4a)	  𝐿!!! =    𝐿!!!!!!!?!!!! = 𝐿!	  (𝑟!,𝜎!, 𝑐!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  	  	  !!!!!!!     	  >	  0;	  	  !!!!!!! < 0;     !!!!!!! 	  <	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4b);	  where:	  h	  =	  h’	  +	  h’’;	  h	  ’=	  1,	  2,…,	  z;	  	  h’’=	  z	  +	  1,	  z	  +	  2,…,	  v;	  and	  z	  ≤	  v.	  
                                                            
15 To simplfy the notation, I also drop the suffix j. 
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Functions	  (3a)	  and	  (3b)	  are	  sufficient	  to	  immediately	  justify	  the	  decreasing	  slope	  of	  the	  two	  corresponding	  demand	  curves	  with	   respect	   to	   r.	   Instead	   functions	   (4a)	   and	   (4b)	  are	  not	   so	  clear-­‐cut	   towards	   the	   slope	   of	   the	   supply	   curves.	   Given	   that	  σ	   is	   –	   by	   definition	   –	   constant	  inside	  each	   risk	   class,	   the	   slope	  of	  𝐿!!! and	  𝐿!!! 	  with	   respect	   to	  r	  will	  depend	  on	   the	  possible	  links	  between	  ck	  and	  𝐿!"! 	  (where:	  k	  =	  1,	  2).	  As	  just	  stated,	  ck	  is	  increasing	  in	  𝐿!"! .	  Hence	  the	  two	  supply	   curves	  have	   an	   increasing	   slope	  with	   respect	   to	   r.	   Together	  with	   condition	   (17	  bis),	  these	   conclusions	   lead	   to	   the	   following	   representation	  of	   the	   Schumpeterian	   equilibrium	   in	  the	  monetary	  market	  (see	  Figures	  1	  and	  2).	  	  	  






















Γ = Θ + γ r1 + ∆C
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  Figure	  2a	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Quantity rationing for a subset of borrowers of class 1 (BF) 
“Red lining” for all the borrowers of class 2
OA = C1
OB = LjS1*    OB = Sj
BF = q. rationing
r1W notional Walrasian rate of interest for class 1
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Differently	   from	   Schumpeter’s	   flawed	   analysis,	   Figure	   1	   shows	   that	   the	   working	   of	   the	  monetary	   market	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   a	   single	   equilibrium	   interest	   rate	   but	   to	   a	   possible	  equilibrium	  interest	  rate	  for	  each	  of	  the	  risk	  classes	  (in	  my	  graphic	  representation,	  r1*	  and	  r2*).	  Moreover	   this	  Figure	   shows	   that,	   since	   capitalist	   j	  can	  only	  offer	   the	  existing	  amount	  of	  his	  past	  savings	  (Sj),	   the	   last	  parts	  of	  his	  supply	  curves	  are	   infinitely	  rigid.	  Finally	   it	  shows	  that	  risk	  averse	  capitalist	   j	   finances,	   first,	  entrepreneurs	  ranked	   in	   the	  class	  with	   the	   lowest	  risk	  and,	  then,	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  class	  with	  the	  highest	  risk	  but	  at	  an	  interest	  rate	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  ϴ	  +	  Ὑ	  𝑟!+	  ∆	  c.	  This	  behavior	  of	  capitalist	  j	  implies	  that	  the	  	  𝐿!!! 	  	  curve	  is	  not	  effective	  (that	  is,	  it	  is	  notional)	  over	  ϴ	  +	  Ὑ	  𝑟!+	  ∆	  c	  (cf.	  the	  relative	  dotted	  line),	  and	  that	  the	  part	  of	  the	  𝐿!!! 	  	  curve	  is	  not	  effective	  (notional)	  between	  r*1	  (≥	  0)	  and	  ϴ	  +	  Ὑ	  𝑟!+	  ∆	  c	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  infinitely	  rigid	  at	  an	  amount	   of	   financing	   equal	   to	   0	   (cf.	   the	   relative	   dotted	   line).	  As	   shown	   by	   Figure	   2a,	   these	  features	  of	  the	  supply	  curves	  of	  capitalist	  j	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  price	  rationing	  for	  all	  the	  borrowers	  of	  class	  2,	  even	  if	  some	  of	  them	  would	  be	  ready	  to	  pay	  an	  interest	  rate	  higher	  than	  ϴ	  +	  Ὑ	  𝑟!+	  ∆	  
c.	  It	  is	  sufficient	  that	  the	  LD2	  curve	  crosses	  the	  	  𝐿!!! 	  in	  its	  notional	  part.	  Moreover,	  as	  shown	  by	  Figure	  2b,	   the	   rigidities	  of	   the	   last	  parts	   of	   capitalist	   j’s	   supply	   curves	   can	   imply	   a	  quantity	  rationing	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  borrowers	  of	  class	  1	  and	  a	  null	  supply	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  (“red	  lining”:	  see	  Stiglitz-­‐Weiss	  1981)	  for	  the	  borrowers	  of	  class	  2.	  It	  is	  sufficient	  that	  the	  LD1	  curve	  crosses	  the	  𝐿!!! 	  curve	  in	  its	  last	  part.	  	  	  Assuming	  that	  each	  of	  the	  n	  entrepreneur	  addresses	  her	  demand	  for	  financing	  to	  all	  the	  m	  competing	  capitalists,	   it	   follows	  that	  each	  entrepreneur	  will	   find	  convenient	  to	  sign	  the	  debt	  contract	   which	   grants	   her	   the	   demanded	   amount	   of	   financing	   at	   the	   lowest	   interest	   rate.	  Hence	   the	   actual	   demand	   of	   entrepreneur	   i	   (i=1,2,...,n)	   is	   addressed	   to	   that	   capitalist	  who	  ranges	  her	  in	  the	  risk	  class	  with	  the	  lowest	  interest	  rate	  and	  who	  is	  ready	  to	  fully	  ‘serve’	  her.	  This	  leads	  to	  an	  actual	  total	  demand	  for	  and	  to	  an	  actual	  total	  supply	  of	  financing	  for	  each	  of	  the	   risk	   classes,	   which	   determine	   an	   equilibrium	   interest	   rate	   for	   each	   of	   these	   classes.	  Compared	  to	  the	  single	  equilibrium	  interest	  rate	  which	  is	  stated	  by	  Schumpeter,	  this	  set	  of	  the	  equilibrium	   interest	   rates	   leads	   to	   a	   screening	   of	   borrowers	   and,	   therefore,	   it	   improves	   ex	  
ante	   the	   social	   efficiency16.	   Moreover,	   a	   specific	   group	   of	   potential	   borrowers	   can	   have	   a	  positive	   excess	   demand	   for	   loans,	   and	   can	   thus	   suffer	   a	   sort	   of	   price	   or	   quantity	   credit	  rationing.	   The	   latter	   involves	   a	   sort	   of	   “red	   lining”	   for	   the	   groups	   of	   potential	   borrowers	  ranked	  in	  higher	  risk	  classes	  than	  that	  partially	  rationed	  by	  all	  the	  m	  capitalists.	  	  	  
4.	  Interest	  rates	  and	  bank	  behavior	  Schumpeter	  (1912,	  1917-­‐18,	  1939)	  does	  not	  perceive	  the	  importance	  of	  problems	  (a)	  and	  (b)	   stated	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   section	  3,	   and	   the	  consequent	  possible	   solutions.	   Schumpeter	  
                                                            
16 What just stated is insufficient to determine the distribution of surplus between entrepreneurs and capitalists. The fact 
that the net profit is completely awarded to the former or the latter, or else that it is divided in more or less fair way, 
depends on the structure of the monetary market. Furthermore, it should be noted that the separating contracts are at the 
basis of the models with signalling.      
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points	  out,	  instead,	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  partial	  equilibrium	  of	  the	  monetary	  market	  (from	  now	  on,	   credit	  market)	  when	   capitalists	   give	  way	   to	   banks.	   The	  most	   prominent	   change	   occurs	  because	  banks,	   rather	   than	   limiting	   themselves	   to	   act	   as	   intermediaries	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  amount	  of	  money	  circulating	   in	   the	  stationary	  state,	   create	  means	  of	  payment	   ex	  novo.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  is	  the	  bank	  credit	  which	  mainly	  determines	  bank	  deposits,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa	  (e.g.:	   Schumpeter	  1970,	  pp.	  181	  and	  183-­‐89).	  According	   to	  Schumpeter	   (1912,	  p.	  294;	  Engl.	  trans.,	  p.	  195),	   this	  change	   implies	   that	   the	   "previous	  picture	  of	   reality	   is	  altered,	  but	   is	  not	  made	   unusable	   in	   its	   main	   features":	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   demand	   for	   financing	   "remains	  provisionally	  unaltered",	  whilst	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  financing	  has	  to	  take	  into	  account	  that	  banks	  have	  a	  more	  elastic	  behavior	  than	  capitalists	  but	  also	  new	  constraints.	  Let	  me	  clarify	  Schumpeter’s	  last	  statement	  by	  comparing	  banks’	  behavior	  with	  my	  previous	  analysis	  of	  capitalists’	  money	  supply.	  The	  credit	  supply	  of	  each	  bank	  continues	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  its	  expectations	  concerning	  the	  default	  risk	  of	  the	  potential	  borrowers,	  and	  it	  depends	  on	  the	   level	   of	   interest	   rates	   on	   loans	   and	   on	   bank	   deposits	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   bank	   debt17.	  However,	  bank	  credit	  supply	  does	  not	  imply	  any	  kind	  of	  sacrifice	  for	  transferring	  the	  present	  purchasing	  power	  into	  the	  future18.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   following	  Schumpeter	  (1939,	  p.	  126;	  see	   also	   1970,	   p.	   148),	   I	   assume	   that	   the	   credit	   market	   is	   characterized	   by	   imperfect	  competition	  so	  that	  each	  of	  the	  m	  banks	  exerts	  a	  –	  more	  or	  less	  stable	  –	  control	  on	  a	  specific	  subset	   of	   borrowers.	   This	  monopolistic	   power	   implies	   that	   each	   bank	   enjoys	   discretionary	  margins	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  its	  interest	  rates.	  This	  same	  power	  also	  implies	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  make	   its	   lending	  a	  "sound"	  activity,	   the	   individual	  bank	  must	  keep	  the	  default	  risks	  of	   its	  subset	   of	   borrowers	   under	   control,	   that	   is,	   it	   must	   judge	   "the	   chances	   of	   success	   of	   each	  purpose	   and,	   as	   a	  means	   to	   this	   end,	   the	   kind	   of	  man	   the	   borrower	   is,	  watching	   him	   as	   he	  proceeds	   and	   granting	   or	   withholding	   further	   support	   accordingly"	   (Schumpeter	   1939,	   p.	  641).	  Obviously	  the	  screening	  made	  by	  each	  bank	  cannot	  affect,	  ex	  ante,	  the	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  potential	  borrowers	  concerning	  the	  innovations	  to	  be	  introduced;	  however,	  this	  screening	  can	  bind	  the	  realization	  of	  (a	  part	  of)	  those	  innovative	  decisions	  and,	  furthermore,	  it	  can	  act	  as	  a	   positive	   or	   negative	   incentive	   for	   the	   initiatives	   of	   the	  most	   loyal	   customers	   (ibidem;	   see	  also:	  1917-­‐18,	  pp.	  104	  and	  109;	  Engl.	  trans.,	  pp.	  202	  and	  206).	  Schumpeter	   is	   aware	   that	   these	   observations	   are	   not	   sufficient	   for	   specifying	   banks'	  behavior	  as	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  loans.	  The	  latter	  is	  also	  constrained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  bank	  creation	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  contributes	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  bank	  deposits	  and,	  together	  with	  the	  actual	  default	  of	  borrowers,	  may	   induce	  a	   liquidity	  shortage	   in	  the	  balance	  of	   the	   individual	  banks	  and/or	  of	   the	  banking	  system.	   If	   the	  portion	  of	  bank	  deposits	   to	  be	   transformed	   into	  
                                                            
17 The	  credit	  supply	  of	  each	  bank	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  its	  direct	  costs	  of	  creation	  of	  means	  of	  payment,	  which	  are	  neglected	  in	  this	  paper. 
18 My Schumpeterian (as well as Schumpeter’s) credit theory of money obviously excludes that banks have any power 
of 'seignorage'. This means that the individual banks cannot finance their own purchases of goods and services through 
the creation of their own means of payment.    
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legal	   tender	   was	   limited	   and	   stable	   and	   if	   there	   were	   not	   institutional	   constraints19,	   the	  default	   of	   borrowers	   and	   the	   increase	   in	   credit	   granting	   would	   not	   represent	   binding	  constraints	   for	   the	   banking	   system	   as	   a	   whole.	   At	   this	   macroeconomic	   stage,	   the	   banking	  system	  would	  be	  able	  to	  transform	  'bad'	  credits	  into	  temporary	  'good'	  credits	  through	  the	  re-­‐financing	  of	  the	  activities	  already	  financed	  but	  in	  financial	  straits	  (see	  Schumpeter	  1912,	  pp.	  163-­‐64;	  Engl.	  trans.,	  pp.	  114-­‐15;	  1927,	  p.	  98;	  1970,	  pp.	  189-­‐90).	  Schumpeter	  does	  not	  follow,	  however,	  this	  line	  of	  analysis.	  Consistently	  with	  the	  criticism	  to	  the	  method	  of	  the	  aggregates	  (e.g.:	  Schumpeter	  1935,	  p.	  136;	  1936	  pp.	  154-­‐55;	  1939,	  pp.	  43-­‐4;	  1946,	  p.	  210;	  1970,	  p.	  269),	  he	  starts	  by	  analyzing	   the	  credit	   supply	  of	   the	   individual	  banks	  and	  not	   that	  of	   the	  banking	  system.	   This	   makes	   the	   Schumpeterian	   analysis	   of	   bank	   behavior	   more	   accurate	   and	  interesting	  than	  Wicksell’s.	  Schumpeter	   rightly	   underlines	   that	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   traditional	   thesis,	   according	   to	  which	  a	  given	  bank	  would	   limit	   itself	   to	   lend	   the	   'money'	  of	   its	  depositors	  and	  –	   therefore-­‐	  could	  not	  grant	  an	  amount	  larger	  than	  its	  deposits,	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  credit	  supply	  curve	  of	   the	   individual	  banks	  becomes	  unbounded.	  This	  rejection	   is	  compatible	  with	   the	   idea	   that	  the	   amount	   of	   credit	   supplied	   is	   "an	   elastic,	   though	   nevertheless	   a	   definite,	   magnitude”	  (Schumpeter	  1912,	   p.	   164;	  Engl.	   trans.,	   p.	   114;	   Schumpeter	  1917-­‐18,	   p.	   107;	  Engl.	   trans.,	   p.	  204).	   It	   follows	  that	  also	  Schumpeter’s	   total	  supply	  of	  credit	  meets	  quantitative	  constraints:	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  "state	  the	  limit	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  purchasing	  power	  [...]	  as	  accurately	  as,	  say,	   the	   limit	   to	  the	  production	  of	  a	  commodity	  [...],	  yet	  we	  can	  state	  that	  there	   is	  such	  a	  limit	  at	  any	  time	  and	  what	  circumstances	  normally	  guarantee	  its	  maintenance”	  (Schumpeter	  1912,	  p.	  163;	  Engl.	  trans.,	  p.	  113).	  Hence,	  differently	  from	  Wicksell	  (1898)	  and	  Hahn	  (1920),	  Schumpeter’s	   total	   supply	   function	   of	   credit	   is	   bounded	   and	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   curve	  infinitely	  elastic	  at	  the	  interest	  rate	  exogenously	  set	  by	  the	  banking	  system.	  	  I	  consider	  this	  conclusion	  as	  a	  mainstay	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Schumpeterian	  debt	  contract	  between	  banks	  and	   innovative	   firms.	  However,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  be	  more	  specific	  about	  the	  elastic	  but	  binding	  constraints	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  by	  bank	  j	  (j=1,2,...,m),	  and	  about	   the	   related	   supply	   curves.	   Following	   Schumpeter,	   I	   assume	   that	   there	   is	   an	   issuing	  central	  bank	  in	  a	  credit	  market	  with	  imperfect	  competition.	  It	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  examine	  different	   institutional	   sets-­‐up	   of	   the	   monetary	   system	   which	   are	   compatible	   with	   this	  assumption.	  Still	  in	  agreement	  with	  Schumpeter	  I	  choose,	  as	  a	  benchmark,	  a	  monetary	  system	  where:	  the	  m	  (commercial)	  banks	  are	  organized	  around	  a	  central	  bank	  but	  the	  latter	  does	  not	  command	   legal	   constraints	  on	  bank	   transactions	   (for	  example,	  a	  minimum	  reserve	  ratio);	   it	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  well-­‐organized	  interbank	  market	  but	  each	  commercial	  bank	  "has,	  at	  any	  time,	  
                                                            
19 As it will be specified at a later stage, Schumpeter (e.g.: 1912, pp. 161-63; Engl. trans., pp. 112-14) refers to an 
economy based on a free gold standard system as well as to an economy where legal tender and bank money coexist. In 
both cases, the non-bank agents may require the conversion of 'claims' on money into money-gold or legal tender. 
Obvioulsy, the problem of conversion would not be present in a 'pure credit' system, but Schumpeter refers very seldom 
to such a system (see 1912, p. 164; Engl. trans., p. 115; 1917-18, p. 110; Engl. trans., p. 206).         
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to	  convert	  its	  deposits	  on	  request	  to	  a	  fixed	  rate	  in	  the	  units	  of	  a	  good".	  This	  organization	  of	  the	  monetary	  system	  can	  be	  called	  “free	  gold	  standard”	  system	  without	   interbank	  market20.	  Let	  me	  also	  assume	  that,	  differently	  from	  capitalists,	  banks	  are	  risk-­‐neutral	  since	  their	  lending	  activity	  is	  not	  constrained	  by	  a	  given	  amount	  of	  past	  savings.	  According	   to	   Schumpeter	   (cf.	   1912,	   pp.	   162-­‐3;	   Engl.	   trans.,	   pp.	   113-­‐14;	   1927,	   pp.	   96-­‐8;	  1939,	  pp.	  120-­‐2;	  1970,	  pp.	  191-­‐92),	   in	  such	  a	  system	  the	  supply	  of	  bank	   j	   is	  constrained	  by	  four	  factors:	  (i)	  the	  demand	  functions	  of	  each	  of	  its	  potential	  borrowers	  (h=1,2,...,v),	  as	  stated	  by	   equations	   (3a)	   and	   (3b)	   above;	   (ii)	   the	   default	   risk	   of	   these	   borrowers	   expected	   by	   the	  same	  bank	   j;	   (iii)	   the	  amount	  and	  the	  cost	  of	   this	  bank’s	   liquidity	  which	  also	  depend	  on	  the	  total	  expected	  demand	  for	  conversion	  into	  gold	  of	  its	  'claims'	  on	  money;	  (iv)	  the	  behaviors	  of	  the	  competing	  banks	  and	  their	  aggregate	  effects.	  Like	   in	  my	  previous	  analysis	  of	  capitalist	   j,	  the	   profit-­‐maximizing	   bank	   j	   fully	   exploits	   its	   power	   of	   discrimination	   towards	   its	   v	  borrowers.	   This	  means	   that	   bank	   j	   groups	   its	   potential	   borrowers	  with	   the	   same	   expected	  profits	  and	  default	  risk	  into	  a	  specific	  risk	  class	  and	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  supply	  curves	  of	  loans	  equal	  to	  the	  number	  of	  risk	  classes	  needed	  to	  rank	  the	  complete	  set	  of	  these	  borrowers	  (Ω	   risk	   classes:	   1	   ≤	   Ω	   ≤	   v,	   with	   k	   =1,2,...,Ω).	   Let	   me	   assume	   that	   the	   deposits	   market	   is	  characterized	  by	  perfect	  competition.	  	  Factors	   (i)-­‐(iv)	   and	   this	   last	   assumption	   suggest	   that	   the	   maximizing	   behavior	   of	   the	  Schumpeterian	  bank	  j	  can	  be	  modeled	  as:	  max	  𝜋! = max [ 1− 𝜎! 𝐿!"! ( 1+ 𝑟!" + (1+ 𝑟!")!)+ 𝜎!𝑋!Ω!!! ]   − (2𝐿! + 𝑖𝐷! +    𝑖!!𝐶𝐵!)   	  (18)	  subject	  to:	  	  1− 𝜎! [ 1+ 𝑟!" + 1+ 𝑟!" !]+   𝜎! !!!!"! 	   ≥	  1+ 𝑖𝐷! +    𝑖!!𝐶𝐵! jjSkLL2 	   	  ∀	  k	  with	  𝐿!"!   >	  0	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (19)	    𝐿!!! 	  ≤	  𝐿!! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ∀	  h	  =	  1,	  2,	  ...,	  v	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (20)	  	    𝐿!"! 	  =	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  	  	  2𝐿! −    𝐿! ≤ 0!!!! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (21)	  	  	  
Gj +CBj (iB ) ≥ 2Lj −
2Ljj∑
m + gj (q
e,ψ j  )Dj 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (22)	  




dCB 	   1),(lim; * =→ jejqq qge ψ 	  where	   the	   new	   symbols	   denote:	   2Lj	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   credit	   supplied	   by	   bank	   j	   at	   the	  opening	   of	   the	   two	   periods	   characterized	   by	   the	   innovative	   processes	   (that	   is	   𝐿!"!   ≡Ω!!!
                                                            
20 See Schumpeter 1970, p. 190; 1912, pp. 161-62, Engl. trans., pp. 112-3; 1939, p. 120). The “free gold standard” 
system is one of the most complex set-up of the credit and monetary markets; hence, its analysis can be easily extended 
to simpler cases. The exclusion of a minimum reserve ratio and of other legal constraints aims to avoid any 
accomodation with respect to the thesis to be proved. However let me note that, according to Schumpeter (1939, p. 122; 
1970, p. 190), not even the introduction of legal limitations would  lead to rigid constraints in bank creation of means of 
payment. The individual banks may, in fact, resort to various technical devices (which today are often named "financial 
innovations") in order to loosen those constraints even in the lack of a well-organized interbank market. Let me finally 
recall that I am assuming that the creation of means of payment does not imply direct costs of 'production'.  
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  2𝐿!),   jD  the amount of deposits held by this same bank,	   i the market interest rate on deposits, Gj	  and	  GCB	   the	   stock	   of	   gold	   held	   –	   respectively	   –	   by	   bank	   j	   and	   by	   the	   central	   bank,	   CBj	   the	  amount	  of	  gold	  lent	  by	  the	  central	  bank	  to	  bank	  j	  and	  iB	  the	  related	  interest	  rate,	  gj	  the	  rate	  of	  conversion	   of	   deposits	   into	   gold	   expected	   by	   bank	   j,	   qe	   the	   expected	   rate	   of	   inflation,	   ψj	   a	  random	  variable	  specific	  to	  bank	  j.	  	  	  	  It	   can	   be	   useful	   to	   specify	   the	   economic	   meaning	   of	   the	   four	   constraints	   (19)-­‐(22).	   (19)	  underlines	  that	  bank	  j	  does	  not	  offer	  debt	  contracts	  with	  negative	  expected	  profits	  to	  any	  set	  of	   its	  borrowers	  grouped	  in	  a	  given	  risk	  class.	  (20)	  represents	  bank	   j’s	  demand	  or	  rationing	  constraints,	  whereas	   (21)	  emphasizes	   the	  possibility	  of	   “red	   lining”.	   Finally	   (22)	   represents	  the	  liquidity	  constraint	  of	  bank	  j:	  it	  implies	  that	  bank	  j	  must	  hold	  an	  amount	  of	  gold	  reserves	  sufficient	   for	   satisfying	   the	   request,	   made	   by	   non-­‐bank	   agents	   or	   by	   competing	   banks,	   to	  convert	   into	  gold	  the	   'claims'	  on	  money	  created	  by	  this	  same	  bank;	  as	  an	  alternative,	  bank	   j	  must	  be	  adequately	  re-­‐financed	  in	  gold	  by	  the	  central	  bank21.	  Let	  assume	  that	  constraint	  (22)	  is	  always	  binding	  for	  CBj.	  One	  or	  more	  of	  the	  other	  three	  constraints	  can	  also	  be	  binding.	  	  	  
5.	  The	  equilibria	  in	  a	  Schumpeterian	  credit	  market	  Equation	   (18)	   and	   constraints	   (19)-­‐(22)	   point	   out	   that,	   like	   in	   my	   previous	   analysis	   of	  capitalist	   j,	   each	   profit-­‐maximizing	   bank	   fully	   exploits	   its	   expected	   power	   of	   discrimination	  with	   respect	   to	   its	  borrowers.	  Hence	  bank	   j	  groups	   its	  potential	  borrowers	   judged	  with	   the	  same	   expected	   profit	   and	   default	   risk	   into	   a	   given	   risk	   class,	   and	   determines	   a	   number	   of	  functions	  of	  loans	  supply	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  number	  of	  risk	  classes	  (Ω)	  needed	  to	  rank	  the	  complete	  set	  of	   these	  borrowers.	  However,	   to	   fully	  understand	  the	  behavior	  of	  bank	   j,	  some	  additional	  analysis	  of	  constraint	  (22)	  and	  of	  other	  constraints	  is	  required.	  As	   just	   stated,	   constraint	   (22)	   is	   always	   binding.	   This	   means	   that,	   when	   the	   amount	   of	  credit	   offered	   by	   bank	   j	  within	   each	   (risk)	   class	   increases,	   the	   amount	   of	   gold	   lent	   by	   the	  central	  bank	  to	  this	  bank	  must	  increase;	  and,	   in	  its	  turn,	  this	   increase	  implies	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  related	  interest	  rate,	  iB.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  credit	  supply	  curve	  of	  bank	  j	  in	  each	  risk	  class	  k	  is	  increasing	  in	  the	  interest	  rate	  rjk22.	  	  
                                                            
21 It should be noted that the gold reserve of the central bank is limited. Therefore, the possibility to re-finance 
commercial banks with gold (in case of liquidity shortage) is subject to limitations. This explains why Schumpeter 
treats the gold standard system as a real, and under many aspects desirable, monetary organization rather than as a 
theoretical case by now out of date. According to Schumpeter (see 1925; 1970, pp. 223-4; see also Shah-Yeager 1994, 
pp. 447 and 453), without money convertibility into gold, the issuing central bank would enjoy so wide discretionary 
margins as to make possible or to (more than) counter any credit policy. 
22 Schumpeter can set up a direct link between the interest rate on loans and the total amount of credit supplied since he 
builds a unique credit supply curve based on a descriptive ordering. On the other hand, here it would be possible to 
justify an increasing credit supply curve of each bank in a given risk class also by assuming that the expected default 
risks of borrowers, grouped in this class, is increasing. The recent literature offers various possible explanations: 
adverse selection effects, negative incentive effects, and so on. 
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Moreover,	   constraint	   (22)	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   amount	   of	   the	  conversion	  into	  gold,	   faced	  by	  bank	   j,	  also	  depends	  on	  its	  credit	  supply	  policy	  relatively	  to	   that	  of	   the	  banking	  sector	  as	  a	  whole.	  By	  assumption,	   in	   the	  monetary	  system	  under	  examination	  there	  is	  not	  a	  well-­‐organized	  interbank	  market,	  and	  the	  deposit	  market	  is	  of	  perfect	   competition	   so	   that	   the	   total	   flow	   of	   deposits	   is	   equally	   allocated	   among	  individual	  banks23.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  bank	  creation	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  equal	  increase	  in	  the	  sum	  between	  bank	  deposits	  and	  the	  conversion	  demand	  for	  gold.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  if	  the	  size	  of	  bank	  j	  is	  big	  enough	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  that	  of	  the	  credit	  market,	  each	  increase	   in	   the	   loan	  granted	  by	   this	  bank	  above	   the	  average	  amount	  of	   loan	  granted	  by	  competing	   banks	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   debt	   of	   the	   former	   bank	   with	   the	   latter.	   Due	   to	   the	  organization	  of	   the	  monetary	   system	  under	   examination,	   the	   repayment	   of	   such	   a	   debt	  	  implies	   a	   compensatory	   gold	   transfer.	   This	   transfer	   determines	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   gold	  reserves	   of	   bank	   j.	   Therefore	   each	   bank,	   working	   in	   a	   credit	   market	   of	   imperfect	  competition	   and	   in	   a	   competitive	   deposit	  market,	   aims	   to	   adopt	   a	   credit	   policy	   in	   line	  with	  the	  policy	  of	  other	  banks,	  that	  is,	  banks	  aim	  to	  "act	  together"24.	  	  Finally,	   constraint	   (22)	   points	   out	   that	   each	   bank	   has	   to	   avoid	   those	   lending	   behaviors	  which	   could	   extend	   in	   time	   or	   make	   it	   persistent	   an	   inflationary	   process.	   According	   to	  Schumpeter’s	  model	  of	  "first	  approximation"	  (that	  is,	  the	  two-­‐phase	  cycle),	  each	  entrepreneur	  realizes	   her	   expectations	   on	   output	   and	   profits.	   “Credit	   inflation"	   is	   thus	   a	   temporary	  phenomenon,	  and	  it	  is	  more	  than	  compensated	  by	  the	  downward	  adjustment	  of	  prices	  due	  to	  the	   the	   supply	   of	   the	   final	   goods	   produced	   by	   the	   innovative	   processes.	   If	   it	   was	   instead	  assumed	   that	   a	   part	   of	   the	   innovations	   does	   not	   realize	   the	   expected	   results	   or	   that	  innovations	   are	   an	   incentive	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   speculative	   behaviors	   (such	   as	   in	  Schumpeter’s	  four-­‐phase	  cycle),	  the	  inflationary	  process	  could	  become	  persistent.	  This	  would	  lead	   to	   a	   conversion	   rate	   (gj)	  of	   bank	  deposits	   into	   gold	   equal	   to	   1.	   For,	   in	   the	   presence	   of	  unexpected	  and	  non-­‐negligible	  increases	  in	  prices	  (i.e.,	  with	  qe≥q*),	  the	  non-­‐bank	  agents	  and	  the	  competing	  banks	  which	  come	  into	  possession	  of	  the	  'claims'	  on	  money	  created	  by	  bank	  j,	  would	   find	   it	   convenient	   to	   ask	   for	   the	   conversion	   into	   gold	   of	   all	   those	   'claims'	   at	   the	  unchanging	  rate	  fixed	  in	  advance.	  Moreover	  the	  banks,	  even	  if	  they	  obtained	  the	  repayments	  agreed	  in	  each	  debt	  contract,	  would	  suffer	  the	  typical	  inflation	  'tax'	  affecting	  creditors.	  Hence,	  
                                                            
23 This simplification is arbitrary because it supposes that each individual bank, although enjoying a monopoly power in 
the credit market, cannot transfer this power to the deposit market. The models which examine the strategic interactions 
among banks in games à la Bertrand, have questioned also the consistency of such assumption (see Yanelle 1989).  
However, these models do not seem able to grasp the specificity of bank behaviors.   
24 Schumpeter (cf. 1970, pp. 191-92) examines the benefits which the individual banks would obtain by "acting 
together". However Schumpeter states that, if the size of a given bank is prominent vis-à-vis the size of the credit 
market, such a bank can decide its credit policy in a (relatively) independent way from that of the competing banks. 
Schumpeter’s statement is implicitly based on the assumption that this same bank can transfer its monopoly power from 
the credit market to the deposits market. In this paper, instead, I have assumed that the deposits market is of perfect 
competition (see above n. 23). It should be noted that Keynes too (1930) stresses the fact that individual banks should 
"act together" concerning their credit policy. However, Keynes does not seem to realize that it is the structure of the 
deposits market to make this constraint binding or non-binding. 
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in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  costs	  due	  to	  the	  reconstitution	  of	   its	  gold	  reserves	  or	   to	   its	   insolvency	  towards	  depositors	  and	  in	  order	  not	  to	  pay	  any	  inflation	  tax,	  each	  bank	  finds	  it	  convenient	  to	  screen	   its	   potential	   borrowers	   and	   to	   only	   finance	   those	   processes	  which	   are	   profitable	   at	  constant	  or	  lowering	  prices.	  	  Constraint	   (19)	   tends	   to	   become	   binding	   when	   bank	   j	   finances	   borrowers	   belonging	   to	  higher-­‐risk	   classes.	  Hence,	   each	  bank	   'serves'	   first	   the	  potential	  borrowers	  belonging	   to	   the	  lowest	   risk	   classes.	   This	   implies	   that	   constraint	   (22)	   may	   be	   more	   binding	   when	   bank	   j	  finances	  higher-­‐risk	  classes.	  My	  general	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  loans	  supplied	  by	  an	  individual	  bank	  to	  each	  class	  of	  borrowers,	  which	  has	  a	  default	  risk	  lower	  than	  a	  given	  critical	  value,	   is	  an	   increasing	   function	  of	   the	   interest	   rate.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  amount	  of	   loans	  supplied	  by	  an	   individual	  bank	   to	   those	   classes	  of	  borrowers	  which	  have	  a	   risk	   rate	  higher	  than	  a	  given	  critical	  value,	  can	  become	  null	  because	  any	  increase	  in	  the	  interest	  rate	  could	  be	  insufficient	  to	  compensate	  either	  such	  a	  risk	  or	  the	  illiquidity	  cost.	  These	  conclusions	  fit	  with	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis:	  the	  credit	  supply	  of	  individual	  banks	  is	  limited.	  However,	  this	  limit	  is	  elastic	  because	  it	  is	  based	  on	  banks’	  expectations	  about	  the	  default	  risk	  of	  borrowers	  and	  the	  expected	  costs	  of	  illiquidity.	  This	  explains	  why	  such	  a	  limit	  does	  not	  justify	  the	  reference	  to	  a	  stable	   "bank	   multiplier"	   and	   why	   it	   heavily	   depends	   on	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   monetary	  system	  (see	  Schumpeter	  1970,	  pp.	  190-­‐91;	  see	  also:	  Schumpeter	  1996,	  ch.XIV).	  These	  observations	  are	  sufficient	  to	  characterize	  the	  behavior	  of	  bank	  j,	  which	  is	  formally	  specified	  by	  equations	  (18)-­‐(22).	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  capitalists	  (see	  above,	  sec.	  3),	  I	  do	  not	  solve	  the	  constrained	  maximization	  problem	  and,	  hence,	  I	  do	  not	  specify	  the	  analytical	  solution	  of	  bank	  j’s	  credit	  supply.	  I	  prefer	  to	  	  have	  recourse	  to	  a	  graphic	  solution,	  by	  reducing	  the	  Ω	  risk	  classes	   to	   two	  (class	  1	  and	  class	  2,	  where	  σ1	  <	  σ2),	   and	  by	  assuming	   that	  bank	   j	  will	  have	  a	  return	   equal	   to	   zero	   on	   the	   loans	   to	   borrowers	   in	   default	   (that	   is,	   Xk	   =	   0).	   These	   two	  simplifications	  imply	  that	  equation	  (18)	  and	  constraint	  (19)	  become	  -­‐	  respectively:	  	  max	  𝜋! 	  =	  max	  {[(1	  –	  σ1)	  LS1( 1+ 𝑟!! +	  (1	  +	  rj1)2)	  +	  (1	  –	  σ2)	  LS2( 1+ 𝑟!! +	  	  (1	  +	  rj2)2)]	  −(2𝐿! + 𝑖𝐷! +    𝑖!!𝐶𝐵!)}  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (18bis)	  
	   1− 𝜎! [ 1+ 𝑟!! + 1+ 𝑟!! !]	  ≥	  1	  +	   𝑖𝐷! +    𝑖!!𝐶𝐵! LS1j2Lj 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (19a)	  1− 𝜎! [ 1+ 𝑟!! 	  +   1+ 𝑟!! !]  ≥	  1+ 𝑖𝐷! +    𝑖!!𝐶𝐵! LS2j2Lj 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (19b)	  	  𝐿!!! 	  =	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  	  2𝐿! −   𝐿!!	  	  ≤	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (21bis)	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(18bis),	   (19a),	   (19b),	   (21bis),	   and	   (20)	   and	   (22)	   imply	   that	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	  entrepreneurs	  who	  are	  the	  potential	  borrowers	  of	  bank	  j	  (that	  is	  the	  subset	  v,	  with	  v	  ≤	  n)	  and	  are	  included	  by	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  risk	  classes	  1	  and	  2,	  can	  be	  depicted	  by	  means	  of	  two	  demand	  curves	  with	  a	  decreasing	  slope	  with	  respect	  to	  rj.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  two	  corresponding	  supply	  curves	  of	  bank	  j	  have	  an	  increasing	  slope	  with	  respect	  to	  rj	  until	  critical	  values	  of	  these	  rate,	   and	   then	   they	   become	   infinitely	   rigid.	   These	   four	   curves	   lead	   to	   the	   following	  representation	  of	  the	  Schumpeterian	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  credit	  market	  (see	  Figures	  3	  and	  4).	  	  



























r2m = minimum value of rj2
rcv = critical value of rj
LjS2
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  Figure	  4a	  	  














Price rationing for all the borrowers of class 2
OA = C
OB = L*1
r2m = minimum value of rj2











Quantity rationing for a subset of borrowers of class 1 (BF)
“Red lining” for the borrowers of class 2
OA = C  
OB = LjS1*
BF = q. rationing
rcv = critical value of rj
r1W = notional Walrasian rate of interest for class 1
0 F LD1 LD2
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Figure	  3	  shows	  that	  the	  working	  of	  the	  credit	  market	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  single	  equilibrium	  interest	   rate	   but	   to	   a	   possible	   equilibrium	   interest	   rate	   for	   each	   of	   the	   risk	   classes	   (in	  my	  graphic	   representation,	   rj1*	   and	   rj2*).	   Moreover	   this	   Figure	   shows	   that,	   since	   bank	   j	   has	   a	  liquidity	  constraint	  (see	  above,	  constraint	  22),	  the	  last	  part	  of	  its	  supply	  curve	  can	  be	  infinitely	  rigid.	  Finally	   it	   shows	   that	  bank	   j	   finances,	   first,	   entrepreneurs	   ranked	   in	   the	   class	  with	   the	  lowest	  risk	  and,	  then,	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  class	  with	  the	  highest	  risk	  but	  at	  an	  higher	  interest	  rate.	  This	  behavior	  of	  bank	  j	  implies	  that	  	  the	  𝐿!!! 	  curve	  is	  not	  effective	  (notional)	  below	  r2m	  –	  where	   r2m	   (	  ≥	   rj1*)	   is	   the	  minimum	   level	   of	   the	   interest	   rate	   of	   the	   debt	   contract	   offered	   to	  borrowers	  ranked	  in	  class	  2.	  As	  shown	  by	  Figure	  4a,	  this	  feature	  of	  the	  riskiest	  supply	  curve	  of	  bank	  j	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  price	  rationing	  for	  all	  the	  borrowers	  of	  class	  2,	  even	  if	  some	  of	  them	  would	  be	  ready	  to	  pay	  an	  interest	  rate	  higher	  than	  r2m.	  It	  is	  sufficient	  that	  LD2	  curve	  crosses	  𝐿!!! 	  in	  its	  notional	  part.	  Moreover,	  as	  shown	  by	  Figure	  4b,	  the	  possible	  rigidities	  of	  the	  last	  parts	  of	  bank	  
j’s	  supply	  curves	  can	  imply	  a	  quantity	  rationing	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  borrowers	  of	  class	  1	  and	  a	  null	   supply	  of	  means	  of	  payment	   (“red	   lining”:	   see	  above)	   for	   the	  borrowers	  of	  class	  2.	   It	   is	  sufficient	  that	  LD1	  curve	  crosses	  	  𝐿!!! 	  curve	  in	  its	  infinitely	  rigid	  part.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Assuming	  that	  each	  of	  the	  n	  entrepreneur	  addresses	  her	  demand	  for	  financing	  to	  all	  the	  m	  competing	   banks,	   it	   follows	   that	   each	   entrepreneur	   will	   find	   convenient	   to	   sign	   the	   debt	  contract	   which	   grants	   her	   the	   demanded	   amount	   of	   financing	   at	   the	   lowest	   interest	   rate.	  Hence	  the	  actual	  demand	  of	  entrepreneur	  i	  (i=1,2,...,n)	  is	  addressed	  to	  that	  bank	  who	  ranges	  her	   in	   the	  risk	  class	  with	   the	   lowest	   interest	   rate	  and	  who	   is	   ready	   to	   fully	   ‘serve’	  her.	  This	  leads	  to	  an	  actual	  total	  demand	  for	  and	  to	  an	  actual	  total	  supply	  of	  credit	  for	  each	  of	  the	  risk	  classes,	  which	  determine	  corresponding	  equilibria	  interest	  rate.	  Moreover,	  a	  specific	  group	  of	  potential	  borrowers	  can	  have	  a	  positive	  excess	  demand	  for	  loans,	  and	  can	  thus	  suffer	  a	  sort	  of	  price	  or	  quantity	  credit	  rationing.	  The	   latter	   involves	  a	  sort	  of	   “red	   lining”	   for	   the	  groups	  of	  potential	   borrowers	   ranked	   in	   higher	   risk	   classes	   than	   that	   partially	   rationed	   by	   all	   the	  m	  banks.	  These	  results	  also	  apply	  to	  a	  monetary	  system	  different	  from	  a	  “free	  gold	  standard”	  without	  interbank	  market.	  Let	  me	  continue	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  credit	  supply	  of	  bank	   j	  has	  a	  binding	  liquidity	   constraint.	   If	   a	   well-­‐organized	   interbank	  market	   is	   introduced	   or	   gold	   is	   replaced	  with	   legal	   tender,	   there	   will	   be	   –	   ceteris	   paribus	   –	   a	   loosening	   of	   constraint	   (22)	   and	   a	  consequent	  shifting	  on	  the	  right	  in	  the	  credit	  supply	  curve	  of	  bank	  j	  for	  each	  of	  the	  risk	  classes	  already	   financed	   as	  well	   as	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   critical	   value	   of	   the	   interest	   rate	   (rcv)	   above	  which	  this	  supply	  can	  become	  nul.	  In	  particular,	  an	  efficient	  interbank	  market	  implies	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  temporary	  illiquidity,	  each	  bank	  may	  resort	  not	  only	  to	  the	  limited	  re-­‐financing	  power	   of	   the	   central	   bank,	   but	   also	   to	   a	   costly	   financing	   by	   competing	   banks.	   This	   last	  possibility	  decreases	  bank’s	  risk	  of	   illiquidity	  but	  does	  not	  eliminate	  the	  increasing	  shape	  of	  the	  illiquidity	  cost25.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  substitution	  of	  legal	  tender	  for	  gold	  lowers,	  even	  
                                                            
25 Cf. Schumpeter 1970, pp. 155-59. It should be noted that, according to Schumpeter (ibid, p. 177), borrowing from 
competing banks and even getting into debt with the central bank – in addition to the more usual cases – must be 
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with	  a	  persistent	  "credit	  inflation",	  the	  expected	  conversion	  rate	  of	  bank	  j’s	  means	  of	  payment,	  and	  cancels	  the	  strict	  re-­‐financement	  limits	  of	  the	  central	  bank	  (Schumpeter	  1970,	  pp.	  167-­‐71;	  see	   also	   above,	   n.	   20).	  However,	   the	   bank	   credit	   supply	   continues	   to	   have	   a	   limit,	   although	  more	   elastic	   than	   in	   the	   gold	   standard	   system	  without	   interbank	  market	   (e.g.:	   Schumpeter	  1912,	   p.	   163;	   Engl.	   trans.,	   p.	   114).	   It	   is	   sufficient	   to	   consider	   that	   the	   bank	   supply	   would	  remain	   bound	   by	   three	   factors:	   the	   increasing	   cost	   of	   central	   bank’s	   re-­‐financing,	   the	  increasing	  default	   risk	  of	   borrowers,	   and	  bank’s	   convenience	   to	   avoid	   inflation	   ‘tax’.	   In	   this	  perspective,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  limit	  in	  the	  credit	  supply	  of	  the	  individual	  bank	  even	  in	  a	  "pure	  credit"	  monetary	  system.	  	  	  	  
6.	  	  Equilibrium,	  disequilibrium,	  and	  bank	  behavior	  Here	   I	  do	  not	  pursue	   further	   refinements	  of	   Schumpeter’s	   analysis	  of	   the	  working	  of	   the	  credit	   market.	   It	   is	   more	   interesting	   to	   combine	   the	   results,	   reached	   in	   the	   two	   previous	  sections,	  with	  the	  role	  played	  by	  bank	  financing	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  desired	  innovations	  in	  Schumpeter’s	  development	  model	   (see	  also:	  Messori	  2004).	  This	  combination	  shows	   that	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  working	  of	  the	  credit	  market,	  once	  amended,	  could	  microfound	  the	  endogenous	  supply	  of	  money	  and	  strengthen	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  macroeconomic	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system.	  It	  follows	  that	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  could	  take	  into	  account	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  issues	  faced	  by	  the	  recent	  monetary	  and	  financial	  theories.	  Obviously	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   Schumpeter’s	  monetary	   theory,	   and	   consequently	  my	  Schumpeterian	   analysis	   of	   bank	   credit	   supply	   and	   demand,	   are	   free	   of	   analytical	   limits.	  Schumpeter	  himself	  (1917-­‐18	  and	  1939)	  tries	  to	  undermine	  the	  foundations	  of	  his	  analysis	  by	  questioning	   the	   application	   of	   the	   demand	   and	   supply	   apparatus	   to	   the	   credit	  market.	   It	   is	  useful	  to	  assess	  Schumpeter’s	  self-­‐criticism	  since	  it	  allows	  the	  specification	  of	  several	  aspects	  of	   my	   Schumpeterian	   approach	   to	   bank	   behavior,	   and	   in	   particular	   my	   turning	   down	   an	  analytical	   representation	   of	   the	   credit	   market	   based	   on	   an	   out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	   dynamics.	  Moreover,	   this	   assessment	   shows	   that	   the	  microeconomic	   behaviors	   of	   banks	   not	   only	   set	  price	  and/or	  quantity	  constraints	  which	  can	  hinder	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  desired	  innovations	  and	  imitations,	  but	  also	  perform	  a	  positive	  role	  of	  coordination	  for	  entrepreneurial	  activities.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   banks’	   role	   of	   coordination	   is	   suggested	   by	   the	   definition	   of	   banker	   as	  being	  the	  "ephor	  of	  the	  exchange	  economy"	  (Schumpeter	  1912,	  p.	  110;	  Engl.	  trans.,	  p.	  74)	  and	  by	  the	  definition	  of	  credit	  market	  as	  being	  "the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  capitalist	  system"	  where	  "the	   settlement	   of	   plans	   for	   further	   development	   is	   decided”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   205;	   Engl.	   trans.,	   p.	  126)26.	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
considered as choices against "the prestige" of the individual bank (that is, a stigma). The financial crisis, which started 
in May 2007 and had a temporary end in April 2009, is a crucial case in point of Schumpeter’s approach.   
26 Schumpeter (1970) and (1996) offer a number of suggestions bearing these implications. My positive appraisal of 
these two contributions contrasts with the way critics have received Das Wesen des Geldes. Apart from the works by 
Schneider (1970) and Graziani (1978) which greatly appreciate Das Wesen des Geldes (see also: Messori 1997), it must 
 23 
Schumpeter's	  criticism	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  apparatus	  to	  the	  credit	  market,	   refers	   to	   the	   (im)possibility	   of	   reaching	   an	   accurate	   determination	   of	   the	   two	  respective	  curves	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  interdependence	  among	  such	  curves.	  	  As	  regards	  to	  the	  first	  aspect,	  Schumpeter	  (see	  1939,	  pp.	  602-­‐6	  and	  608;	  see	  also:	  Messori	  1987,	   sec.	   3)	   states	   that	   the	   problems	   are	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   phases	   of	   the	   cyclical	  development	  are	  in	  disequilibrium.	  In	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	  process,	  the	  profit	  level	  expected	  from	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   innovative	   or	   imitative	   processes	   is	   subject	   to	   very	   frequent	  variations;	  furthermore,	  there	  are	  repeated	  changes	  in	  the	  number	  and	  in	  the	  'scale'	  of	  these	  processes.	   These	   factors	   of	   instability	   determine	   too	   frequent	   shifts	   in	   the	   credit	   demand	  curve	  of	  the	  individual	  entrepreneurs	  and,	  a	  fortiori,	  in	  the	  corresponding	  aggregate	  demand	  curve.	  As	  noticed	  by	  Schumpeter,	  these	  shifts	  in	  the	  credit	  demand	  curves	  also	  encompass	  the	  credit	   supply	   curve	   of	   the	   individual	   bank	   since	   they	   change	   the	   points	   in	   which	   a	   given	  demand	   curve	   intersects	   the	   respective	   supply	   curve.	   Moreover,	   my	   refinement	   of	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  on	  banks	  behavior	   implies	   that	   the	   instability	   in	   the	  expected	  profits	  and	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  innovative	  processes	  directly	  affects	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  default	  risk	  and	  of	  the	  related	  monetary	  proceeds	  in	  the	  various	  classes	  of	  borrowers	  and	  the	  same	  composition	  of	  each	  of	  these	  classes.	  This	  means	  that	  repeated	  shifts	  also	  occur	  along	  the	  and	  in	  the	  supply	  curves	  of	  financing	  of	  the	  different	  banks.	  Schumpeter's	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  apparatus	  to	  the	  credit	  market	  is	  of	  such	  a	  "doubtful	  value"	  that	  the	  working	  of	  this	  market	  has	  an	  "element	  of	  indeterminateness",	  and	  that	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  interest	  rate	  to	  ensure	  the	  equilibrium	  in	  this	  market	  is	  overestimated.	  This	   conclusion	   seems	   to	   ask	   for	   an	   out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	   dynamics,	   where	   different	  innovative	  processes	  begin	  and	  end	  up	   in	  every	   instant	  and	  where	  the	  credit	  and	  the	  goods	  markets	  work	  in	  continuous	  time.	  In	  this	  framework	  the	  labor	  and	  the	  goods	  markets	  would	  be	  always	  open,	  and	  	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  analytically	  prove	  that	  each	  innovative	  firm	  as	  well	   as	   the	   whole	   set	   of	   innovative	   firms	   have	   to	   pay	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   wages	   before	  monetizing	   their	   outputs.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   it	   would	   become	   impossible	   to	   specify	   the	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	   side	  of	   the	  different	  debt	   contracts:	   in	  each	   instant,	   some	   firms	  could	  self-­‐finance	  their	  innovative	  processes	  and	  others	  would	  have	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  indefinite	  amount	  of	  credit.	  Hence,	  from	  the	  analytical	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  would	  be	  lost	  one	  of	  the	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  monetary	  analysis,	   that	   is	   that	   the	  availability	  of	  banks’	   credit	   is	   	   a	  binding	   constraint	   for	   the	   starting	   of	   each	   innovative	   process.	   I	   then	   prefer	   to	   follow	   the	  discrete	   time	  sequence	  which	  characterizes	  Schumpeter’s	  processes	  of	  cyclical	  development	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
be remembered that the most known reviews of Schumpeter (1970) are fairly negative (cf. Guillebaud 1971; 
Schinzinger 1971; and Rothschild 1973). These three reviews are unanimous in affirming that (i) Schumpeter (1970) is 
unusable as a money textbook, that (ii) it is too abstract and complex, and that (iii) it is of little analytical importance.  
A similar judgment is confirmed by both Allen (1991) and Reclam (1984). The arguments developed below should 
explain why I move away from such negative judgments. 
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and	  which	   allows	   to	   subdivide	   each	  phase	   of	   the	   Schumpeterian	   cycle	   into	   several	   periods,	  and	  each	  period	  into	  different	  instants.	  	  If	  one	  refers	  to	  this	  time	  structure	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  two-­‐phase	  cycle,	  it	  will	  emerge	  at	  least	  three	   elements:	   (i)	   as	   already	   stated,	   entrepreneurs’	   demands	   for	   financing	   and	   the	  corresponding	   banks’	   supplies	   are	   set	   and	   realized	   at	   the	   opening	   instant	   of	   each	   period	  where	  an	  innovative	  or	  an	  imitative	  process	  occurs,	  (ii)	  at	  the	  opening	  instant	  of	  each	  of	  these	  periods,	   entrepreneurs'	   expectations	   about	   the	   future	   profits	   on	   their	   new	   activities	   to	   be	  financed,	  and	  banks'	  expectations	  about	  the	  default	  risks	  and	  the	  related	  monetary	  proceeds	  of	  their	  potential	  borrowers	  are	  given,	  and	  (iii)	  during	  the	  same	  or	  the	  following	  period,	  the	  market	   of	   final	   goods	   is	   cleared	   and	   the	   new	   productive	   activities	   achieve	   the	   expected	  outputs.	   Points	   (i)-­‐(iii)	   show	   that	   Schumpeter's	   (1939)	   statement,	   concerning	   the	  disequilibrium	   in	   the	   cyclical	   processes,	  must	   be	   refined.	   In	   a	   discrete	   time	   sequence,	   each	  out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	   process	   realizes	   a	   temporary	   equilibrium	   even	   if	   it	   does	   not	   meet	   the	  conditions	   for	   a	   sequential	   equilibrium	   (see	  Hicks	  1965,	   chs.	   2	   and	  3).	  This	  means	   that	   the	  decisions,	  undertaken	  by	  banks	  and	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  credit	  market	  at	  the	  opening	  instant	  of	   a	   given	   period,	   are	   affected	   by	   the	   conditions	   occurred	   in	   the	   different	   markets	   in	   the	  course	  of	   the	  previous	  period	  and	  by	   their	  expectations	  on	   the	   future	  events,	  but	  cannot	  be	  modified	  at	  all	  by	  the	  actual	  events	  occurring	  in	  the	  current	  period.	  	  	  It	  follows	  that,	  differently	  from	  what	  has	  been	  stated	  by	  Schumpeter	  (1939),	  the	  instability	  of	   the	   supply	   and	   demand	   curves	   for	   financing	   does	   not	   jeopardize	   the	   application	   of	   the	  demand	   and	   supply	   apparatus	   to	   the	   credit	  market.	   In	   fact,	   the	   credit	   demand	   and	   supply	  curves	  tend	  to	  be	   instable	   from	  a	  period	  to	  another	  but	  to	  be	  well	  defined	  and	  stable	  at	   the	  opening	  instant	  of	  each	  period.	  Therefore,	  given	  my	  refinements	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  of	  bank	   behavior,	   the	   credit	   demand	   and	   supply	   curves	   ensure	   temporary	   equilibria	   in	   a	  Schumpeterian	  credit	  market	  which	  is	  part	  of	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	  multiperiod	  development	  process.	  	  	  However,	  such	  a	  result	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  robust	  to	  a	  second	  criticism	  which	  Schumpeter	  considers	  of	  great	   importance:	   the	   interdependence	  between	   the	  credit	  demand	  and	  supply	  curves.	  Schumpeter	  maintains	   the	   following	  argument	   (cf.	  1912,	  p.	  298;	  Engl.	   trans.,	  p.	  198;	  1917-­‐18,	  pp.	  110-­‐11;	  Engl.	   trans.,	  p.	  207):	   the	  credit	  demand	  and	  supply	  curves	  are	  useless	  analytical	  tools	  because,	  whenever	  a	  given	  bank	  meets	  entrepreneurs’	  demand	  for	  financing,	  the	  corresponding	  credit	  demand	  curve	  shifts	  upwards	  and,	  hence,	  begins	  an	  endless	  process	  of	  shifts	  along	  the	  supply	  curve	  and	  in	  the	  demand	  curve.	  	  The	  rationale	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  argument	  is	  quite	  simple.	  In	  his	  cyclical	  development	  model,	  entrepreneurs	   demand	   to	   banks	   that	   amount	   of	   means	   of	   payment	   which	   is	   required	   for	  withdrawing	  the	  units	  of	  the	  labor	  services	  (and	  of	  the	  here	  neglected	  land	  services)	  from	  the	  old	  productive	  units	  of	  the	  stationary	  state.	  Entrepreneurs	  need	  those	  units	  for	  starting	  their	  innovative	  or	  imitative	  processes.	  To	  simplify	  the	  matter,	  let	  me	  assume	  that	  the	  demand	  for	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financing	   of	   the	   set	   of	   entrepreneurs	   is	   equal	   to	   the	   amount	   of	  money	  wages	  which,	   at	   the	  money	  wage	  rate	  in	  force	  at	  the	  stationary	  state,	  guarantees	  the	  purchasing	  of	  the	  labor	  units	  which	   are	   strictly	   necessary	   for	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   innovative	   processes27.	   Given	   the	   full	  employment	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  of	  the	  stationary	  state28,	  and	  given	  the	  set	  of	  new	  activities	  be	  large	  enough	  to	  influence	  market	  prices,	  the	  new	  demand	  for	  labor	  units	  causes	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  equilibrium	  money	  wage.	  Besides	  eliminating	  a	  part	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  labor	  services	  made	  by	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  units	  already	  producing	  in	  the	  stationary	  state	  and	  still	  using	   the	  non-­‐innovative	  methods,	   such	  an	   increase	  makes	   the	  demanded	  amount	  of	   credit	  insufficient	   for	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   innovative	   processes.	   In	   order	   to	   hire	   the	   still	   lacking	  labor	  units,	  entrepreneurs	  have	  to	  obtain	  an	  additional	  financial	  support	  by	  banks.	  However,	  if	   entrepreneurs’	   expectations	   continue	   to	   be	   static	   and	   'myopic',	   banks	   supply	   of	   this	  additional	   financing	   will	   determine	   an	   unexpected	   further	   increase	   in	   money	   wages	   and,	  therefore,	  further	  increases	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  credit.	  	  Schumpeter's	   (1917-­‐18)	   conclusion	   is	   that	   any	   increase	   in	   the	   credit	   granted	   causes	   a	  further	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  financing	  which	  is	  needed	  for	  purchasing	  a	  given	  amount	  of	  labor	   services	   and,	   therefore,	   a	   further	   increase	   in	   the	   demand	   for	   credit.	   This	   conclusion	  suggests	  that	  the	  interdependence	  between	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  curves	  for	  credit	  primes	  a	  run	  which	   can	   be	   stopped	   only	   through	   a	   quantity	   credit	   rationing	   by	   the	   different	   banks.	  Credit	   rationing	  prevents	   entrepreneurs	   from	   realizing	   all	   their	  desired	   innovations	   and,	   in	  the	  case	  just	  examined,	  can	  even	  hinder	  the	  starting	  of	  the	  cyclical	  development29.	  In	  any	  case,	  even	  before	  binding	  quantitative	  constraints	  occur,	   the	  credit	  market	  becomes	  unstable	  and	  transmits	  its	  instability	  to	  the	  labor	  market.	  	  Therefore,	   the	   interdependence	   between	   the	   supply	   and	   demand	   curves	   for	   financing	  seems	  to	  provide	  a	  robust	  foundation	  to	  Schumpeter's	  criticism	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  apparatus	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  credit	  market.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  Schumpeter	  (1917-­‐18	  and	  1939)	  does	  not	  prove	  his	  statement.	  From	  a	  formal	  point	  of	  view,	  this	   statement	   amounts	   to	   stating	   that	   the	   progression	   of	   the	   increases	   in	   the	   demand	   for	  financing	   or	   the	   corresponding	   progression	   of	   the	   increases	   in	   the	   money	   wages	   do	   not	  asymptotically	  approach	  zero,	  or	  else	   that	   the	  series	  of	   the	  amount	  of	  credit	  demanded	  and	  the	  corresponding	  series	  of	   the	   level	  of	  money	  wages	  do	  not	  asymptotically	  approach	  given	  
                                                            
27 This assumption is heroic since it implies that (a) the new processes have a given minimum technical size, and that 
(b) the entrepreneurs act on the basis of static and 'myopic' expectations, rather than on the basis of rational or – at least 
– adaptive expectations. However, compared to the problem analyzed here, these are not restrictive assumptions 
because they strengthen Schumpeter's argument which I aim to criticize. The same applies to the other simplifying 
assumptions which will be introduced in the course of my reasoning.       
28 Although Schumpeter refers to the traditional labor supply curve, which – at least in the first part – is increasing with 
the real wage (e.g.: 1912, pp. 27-8; Engl. trans., pp. 22-3), Schumpeter’s analysis requires that the labor supply becomes 
infinitely rigid at the predetermined level of full employment. For a brief discussion of the ad hoc assumptions which 
must be introduced to make Schumpeter’s analysis coherent, see: Messori 1987, p. 147, nn. 12 and 13.   
29 It should be noted that Schumpeter does not explicitly discuss the possibility of credit rationing and, therefore, 
provides neither a precise definition, nor an analytical foundation of this phenomenon.      
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values.	  However,	  it	  can	  be	  easily	  proved	  that	  such	  implications	  are	  not	  correct.	  Even	  if	  a	  set	  of	  heroic	   conditions	   which	   are	   the	   most	   favorable	   to	   Schumpeter's	   thesis	   (myopia	   in	  entrepreneurial	  expectations,	  minimum	  technical	  scale	  of	  the	  innovative	  activity,	  lack	  of	  price	  and	  quantity	  rationing)	  is	  assumed,	  a	  formal	  analysis	  of	  the	  first	  two	  progressions	  will	  prove	  their	  convergence	  towards	  zero	  and	  a	   formal	  analysis	  of	   the	   last	   two	  series	  will	  prove	  their	  convergence	  towards	  given	  values30.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  results	  show	  that	  the	   interdependence	  between	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  curves	   for	  credit	  is	  bound	  to	  well	  defined	  limits.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  such	  interdependence	  can	  make	  the	  efficient	  design	  of	   the	  debt	  contract	  between	  the	   individual	  bank	  and	   its	  borrowers	  with	  an	  equal	   function	   of	   the	   expected	   profit	   and	   default	   risk,	   more	   complex31.	   However,	   such	  interdependence	  cannot	  justify	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  apparatus	  as	  a	  useful	  tool	   for	   analyzing	   the	   working	   of	   the	   credit	   market	   in	   temporary	   equilibrium.	   Hence	   my	  previous	   analysis	   of	   the	   working	   of	   the	   Schumpeterian	   credit	   market,	   which	   represents	   a	  refinement	  of	  Schumpeter's	  framework,	  shows	  to	  be	  robust	  even	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  criticism	  raised	  by	  Schumpeter	  himself.	  	  	  
7.	  Conclusions:	  banks	  as	  social	  accountants	  This	   conclusion	  contrasts	  with	  various	  passages	  by	  Schumpeter	   (1917-­‐18	  and	  1939)	  but	  not	  with	  the	  remarks	  made	  in	  Schumpeter	  (1970).	   In	  this	   last	  work,	  Schumpeter	  underlines	  that	   his	   criticism	   of	   the	   demand	   and	   supply	   apparatus	   concerns	   its	   application	   "to	   the	  problems	  of	  money	  value"	  and	  not	  its	  application	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  banks	  and	  borrowers	  (cf.	  1970,	  pp.	  306-­‐13;	  see	  also:	  ibid,	  p.	  233).	  Schumpeter	  (1970),	  by	  examining	  in	  detail	  the	  supply	  and	   demand	   for	   financing,	   goes	   indeed	   so	   far	   as	   to	   hint	   that	   the	   individual	   bank	   finds	   it	  convenient	   to	   determine	   various	   supply	   curves	   as	   a	   screening	   device	   of	   its	   potential	  borrowers;	  and,	  although	  at	  an	  empirical	  more	  than	  at	  a	  theoretical	  stage,	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  also	  ready	  to	  abandon	  the	  reference	  to	  a	  unique	  equilibrium	  interest	  rate.	  However	   the	  essential	  contribution,	  offered	  by	  Schumpeter	  (1970)	  as	  regards	   to	   the	  way	  the	  credit	  market	  works,	  does	  not	  concern	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  curves	  for	  financing	   but	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   of	   coordination	   played	   by	   the	   credit	   market	   for	   the	  entrepreneurial	   activities	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   cyclical	   development.	   As	   recalled	   above,	   this	  role	  of	  coordination	  is	  suggested	  both	  in	  Schumpeter	  (1912,	  pp.	  110	  and	  205,	  Engl.	  trans.,	  pp.	  
                                                            
30 In this paper it is not useful to investigate such problem in a detailed way. For a more precise analysis, let me refer to: 
Messori 1987, secs. 4 and 5. 
31 By referring to recent contributions concerning the debt contracts design between an individual bank and its 
borrowers, it would be possible to re-interpret the Schumpeterian approach by means of a "three-stage game". In the 
first stage the bank offers various debt contracts, in the second stage each borrower chooses the preferred contract 
amongst those offered to her, and in the third stage the bank decides which contracts to carry out given borrowers’ 
choices. The interdependence among the supply and demand curves for credit complicates this three-stage game. At the 
end of the third stage, the borrowers who have been served may ask the bank to reiterate the game by starting again 
from the first stage. At the same time, the bank may confirm or modify its supply of debt contracts.       
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74	   and	   126)	   and	   in	   Schumpeter	   (1939,	   p.	   641),	   but	   it	   is	   deeply	   investigated	   only	   in	  Schumpeter	  (1970).	  In	  the	  latter	  this	  same	  role	  of	  credit	  market	  finds	  an	  ideal	  foundation	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  economic	  system	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  amongst	  the	  monetary	  budgets	  of	  the	  individual	  agents.	  In	  this	  respect	  Schumpeter	  states	  that,	  in	  a	  capitalist	  economy,	  all	  the	  economic	   subjects	   "have	   to	   settle	   the	   accounts	   amongst	   themselves	   and	   have	   to	   verify	   the	  accounts	  of	  their	  individual	  productive	  processes"	  so	  that	  the	  individual	  behaviors	  are	  subject	  to	   the	   constraint	   of	   the	   individual	   budgets	   and	   are	   made	   compatible	   within	   "an	   economic	  
book-­‐keeping	  of	  the	  society".	  Schumpeter	  adds	  that	  the	  regulation	  and	  the	  verification	  of	  such	  accounts	  are	  managed	  by	  banks	  through	  the	  accounting	  entries	  which	  refer	  to	  the	  lending	  and	  to	   the	   exchanges	   amongst	   agents	   and	   through	   the	   reckoning	   of	   the	   consequent	   interbank	  relations	   on	   the	   relative	  market	   or	   through	   the	   central	   bank,	   so	   that	   the	   "current	   account	  balances"	  become	  the	  "fundamental	  concept	  of	  the	  monetary	  doctrine"32.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  banking	  system	  is	  urged	  to	  manage	  the	  essential	  components	  of	  the	  system	  of	  payments	  and	  to	  act	  as	  the	  center	  of	  the	  social	  accounts.	  This	  function	  of	  social	  accountant,	  which	   stresses	   the	   "essence	   of	   money	   as	   a	   social	   institution"	   needed	   for	   guaranteeing	   the	  constrained	   realization	   of	   individual	   choices	   and	   for	   rendering	   these	   choices	   mutually	  compatible,	  has	  a	  crucial	  impact	  on	  the	  working	  of	  the	  economy.	  It	  implies	  that	  each	  bank,	  by	  creating	  means	  of	  payment	  in	  favor	  of	  entrepreneurs	  and	  by	  controlling	  the	  budget	  constraint	  of	  its	  depositors,	  regulates	  the	  access	  that	  non-­‐bank	  agents	  have	  to	  the	  different	  markets	  and,	  to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   attests	   their	   economic	   credibility.	   Schumpeter’s	   considerations	   become	  particularly	  important	  if	  the	  case	  of	  bank	  loans	  to	  the	  entrepreneurs	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  current	  models	  with	   imperfect	   information.	   In	  order	   to	  achieve	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  of	   its	   flows	  of	  financing	   and	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   the	   best	   entrepreneurs	   with	   adequate	   incentives,	   each	  individual	  bank	  must	  collect,	  centralize	  and	  utilize	  information	  for	  the	  design	  of	  optimal	  debt	  contracts	  to	  be	  offered	  to	  its	  potential	  borrowers	  with	  a	  default	  risk	  lower	  than	  a	  given	  critical	  value,	   and	   for	   the	  quantity	   rationing	  of	   the	   remaining	  potential	   borrowers.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	  allocation	  and	  the	  supply	  conditions	  of	  the	  financing	  made	  available	  by	  each	  bank	  spread	  the	  information	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  different	  entrepreneurs	  to	  the	  whole	  set	  of	  non-­‐bank	  agents.	  	  	  This	   re-­‐interpretation	   of	   banks	   as	   social	   accountants	   strengthens	   the	   meaning	   of	   some	  passages	   by	   Schumpeter	   himself	   (1912	   and	   1939)	   concerning	   bank	   behavior	   and	   quoted	  above.	   For	   example:	   the	   function	   of	   social	   book-­‐keeping,	   fulfilled	   by	   banks,	   clarifies	   why	  Schumpeter	   (1912)	   stresses	   that	   bank	   credit	   represents	   a	   "voucher"	  which	   is	   issued	   in	   the	  
                                                            
32 Schumpeter 1970, pp. 125-27. It is interesting to note that this analysis induces Schumpeter to set up a parallel 
between the "central agency of a socialist community" and the banking system. In the pages just quoted, Schumpeter 
states that "even the market economy is a planned economy", and that the plan is coordinated by that "central 
accounting department of the society" which is the banking system. This implies that the function fulfilled by the means 
of payment as units of account is essential in the socialist as well as in the capitalist economy. As suggested by Hicks 
(e.g.: 1956; see also: Messori-Tamborini 1995), the reference to the budgets of the individual agents and to the social 
book-keeping allows also to analyze the credit flows and the money stocks within a unique monetary theory.  
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name	  of	  the	  society	  and	  which	  allows	  entrepreneurs	  to	  buy	  before	  having	  sold.	  The	  reference	  to	   such	   a	   function	   also	   clarifies	  why	   the	   Schumpeterian	   banks	   have	   to	   perform	   not	   only	   a	  screening	  activity	  about	  their	  own	  borrowers,	  but	  also	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  incentive	  activity	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   preferred	   customers.	   Such	   an	   incentive	   activity	   occurs	   nearly	  automatically:	  bank	  financing	  of	  a	  given	  innovative	  process	  acts	  as	  a	  positive	  signal	  as	  regard	  to	   its	   expected	   profitability	   and,	   hence,	   it	   stimulates	   secondary	   innovations	   or	   	   imitative	  processes.	  	  	  Schumpeter's	   hints	   (1970)	   are	   relevant	   for	   credit	   theory	   since	   they	   highlight	   the	  macroeconomic	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  social	  accountants	  carried	  out	  by	  individual	  banks.	  Unfortunately	   these	  hints	  have	  been	  neglected	   in	   the	  history	  of	  economic	  analysis	  and	  have	  only	  re-­‐emerged	   in	   the	  recent	   literature.	  The	  merit	  of	  such	  rediscovery	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  Stiglitz	   and	  Weiss	   (1988)	   who	   refer	   to	   the	   bank	   function	   of	   social	   accountant	   in	   order	   to	  explain	  the	  establishment	  of	  customer	  relationships	  between	  banks	  and	  firms	  in	  an	  economic	  process	   with	   information	   asymmetries33.	   In	   Stiglitz-­‐Weiss'	   model	   such	   a	   function	   has	   an	  essential	   role	   to	   play	   because	   it	   can	   mitigate	   the	   negative	   effects	   which	   the	   information	  asymmetries	  exercise	  on	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  economic	  system.	  Unlike	  the	  information	  spread	  by	  non-­‐bank	  agents,	  the	  granting	  of	  loans	  represents	  a	  credible	  signal	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons:	  by	  having	  economic	  relations	  with	  a	  wide	  but	  limited	  range	  of	  borrowers,	  each	  bank	  is	  in	  the	  optimal	   position	   for	   assessing	   the	   absolute	   and	   relative	   degree	   of	   reliability	   of	   each	   of	   its	  borrowers;	  by	  drawing	  up	  debt	  contracts	  with	  the	  screened	  entrepreneurs,	  each	  bank	  takes	  upon	  itself	  the	  risk	  of	  its	  assessment.	  Stiglitz-­‐Weiss'	   (1988)	   considerations	   start	   to	   highlight	   the	   modernity	   of	   Schumpeter's	  analysis	   in	   attributing	   to	   the	   banks	   the	   function	   of	   social	   accountants.	   However,	   these	  considerations	  are	  not	  sufficient	  for	  stressing	  the	  potentialities	  of	  such	  a	  function	  with	  respect	  to	   the	   recent	   models	   on	   credit	   market,	   characterized	   by	   the	   assumption	   of	   information	  asymmetries	  between	  the	  "principal"	  (an	  individual	  bank)	  and	  the	  “agents”	  (its	  borrowers).	  In	  Schumpeter's	   framework	   (1912,	   1939,	   and	   1970),	   there	   is	   no	   reference	   to	   the	   concept	   of	  information	   asymmetries;	   however	   Schumpeter	   (1970)	   perceives	   that,	   by	   carrying	   out	   the	  function	   of	   social	   accountant,	   any	   individual	   bank	   can	   acquire	   information	   advantages,	  compared	  to	  its	  competing	  banks,	  with	  respect	  to	  given	  subsets	  of	  borrowers	  and,	  therefore,	  with	  respect	  to	  specific	  segments	  of	  the	  credit	  market.	  Schumpeter	  (1970,	  pp.	  153-­‐54)	  states	  that	   each	   bank	   can	   control	   and	   manage	   a	   "piece	   of	   the	   social	   book-­‐keeping";	   and	   this	  management	  involves	  the	  acquisition	  and	  the	  centralization	  of	  information	  as	  regards	  to	  the	  subjects	   involved.	   Therefore,	   each	   individual	   bank	   has	   a	   greater	   information	   than	   the	  competing	  banks	  about	  the	  borrowers	  who	  belong	  to	  its	  "piece"	  of	  the	  social	  book-­‐keeping.	  
                                                            
33 Stiglitz-Weiss (1988) recognize, through a long quotation in a footnote, their debt with respect to Schumpeter (1970).  
It should be remembered that there is information asymmetry when the subjects (buyers or sellers), operating on a side 
of a given market, have more information about some variables which are important for the exchange, than the subjects 
(sellers or buyers), operating on the other side of the same market.         
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My	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  reexamination	  of	  Schumpeter’s	  monetary	  theory	  leads	  to	  at	  least	  two	   interesting	   results:	   (i)	   this	   theory,	   elaborated	   in	   the	   major	   works	   of	   Schumpeter	   (see	  1912,	  1939,	  1954)	  as	  well	  as	   in	  Schumpeter	   (1917-­‐18),	   is	   further	  developed	   in	  Schumpeter	  (1970	  and	  1996);	   (ii)	   such	  developments	   largely	   contribute	   to	  point	  out	   its	   importance	  not	  only	  for	  the	  twentieth	  century	  history	  of	  the	  monetary	  analysis	  but	  also	  for	  the	  recent	  debate	  in	  monetary	  theory.	  Concerning	  point	  (i),	  as	  just	  said	  the	  Theory	  of	  money	  and	  banking	  opens	  the	   possibility	   of	   replacing	   the	   interest	   rate	   with	   a	   vector	   of	   interest	   rates	   and	   restrains	  Schumpeter's	  criticism	  (1917-­‐18	  and	  1939)	  of	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  curves	  for	  credit	  to	  the	  problem	   of	   the	   value	   of	   money.	   Concerning	   point	   (ii),	   this	   same	   book	   helps	   the	  microfoundation	   of	   the	   bank	   behaviors	   and	   offers	   a	   first	   explanation	   to	   the	   information	  distribution	  amongst	  banks.	  	  Point	  (i)	  implies	  that	  Schumpeter’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  working	  of	  the	  credit	  market	  represents	  the	  peak	  of	   that	  stream	  in	   the	  history	  of	  monetary	  analysis	  which	   is	  opened	  by	  Marx	   in	   the	  second	  and	  third	  book	  of	  Capital	  and	  is	  continued	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Wicksell	  (1898),	  A.	  Hahn	  (1920),	   Robertson	   (1926)	   and	   Keynes	   (1930).	   In	   particular,	   compared	   to	   Wicksell	   (1898)	  pure	   credit	   system,	   Schumpeter’s	   approach	   underlines	   that	   the	   individual	   bank	   does	   not	  behave	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  unique	  and	  infinitely	  elastic	  supply	  of	  means	  of	  payment	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  set	  of	  supplies	  which	  are	  an	  increasing	  function	  of	  interest	  rates	  and	  which	  become	   infinitely	   rigid	   besides	   given	   amounts	   of	   financing.	   Compared	   to	   Keynes	   (1930),	  Schumpeter’s	  approach	  stresses	   that	   the	   links	  between	   the	  credit	   and	   the	  deposits	  markets	  are	  crucial	  to	  analyze	  the	  constraints	  which	  the	  competing	  banks	  place	  on	  the	  lending	  activity	  of	  each	  individual	  bank.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  recent	  analyses	  of	  the	  credit	  market,	  point	  (ii)	  implies	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  different	  type	  of	  information	  asymmetries:	  the	  asymmetries	  among	  competing	  banks.	  Sharpe	  (1990)	  refers	  to	  this	  type	  of	  asymmetries	  when	  he	  underlines	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  long-­‐term	  "customer	  relationships"	  between	  individual	  banks	  and	  specific	  groups	  of	  borrowers	  can	  imply	  that	  the	  latter	  are	  "informationally	  captured"	  by	  the	  former.	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  information	  asymmetries	  which	  have	  been	  examined	  by	  various	  models	  on	   credit	   rationing	  (see	   Stiglitz-­‐Weiss	   1981,	   1992;	   Milde-­‐Riley	   1988),	   Sharpe's	   model	   is	   centered	   on	   the	  relationships	  between	  the	  individual	  bank	  and	  its	  different	  borrowers.	  Hence,	  when	  firms	  are	  "informationally	   captured"	   by	   a	   given	   bank,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   information	   asymmetry	  between	   this	   bank	   and	   its	   borrowers	   decreases.	   Vice	   versa,	   concerning	   the	   relationships	  among	  different	  banks,	  the	  information	  asymmetries	  implicitly	  perceived	  by	  Schumpeter	  are	  complementary	   to	   those	   between	   a	   given	   bank	   and	   its	   borrowers.	   The	   function	   of	   social	  accountant,	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  bank	  in	  favor	  of	  its	  borrowers,	  ensures	  an	  information	  advantage	  to	  this	  bank	  compared	  to	  the	  competing	  banks	  but	  it	  does	  not	  eliminate	  its	  lack	  of	  information	  concerning	  its	  borrowers.	  	  	  
 30 
Such	   a	   result	   is	   important	   for	   various	   reasons.	   For	   example,	   still	   better	   than	   in	   Sharpe’s	  model	   (1990),	   the	   Schumpeterian	   framework	   allows	   to	   examine	   the	   form	   and	   degree	   of	  segmentation	  of	   the	   credit	  market	  by	   resorting	   to	   the	  new	   tools	  offered	  by	   the	   information	  distribution.	   However,	   the	   most	   important	   implication	   is	   that,	   by	   making	   the	   information	  asymmetries	   between	   banks	   and	   between	   an	   individual	   bank	   and	   its	   borrowers	  complementary,	  the	  analysis	  of	  debt	  contracts	  is	  greatly	  enriched.	  In	  the	  parlance	  of	  contract	  theory,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   single	   "principal"	   and	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   agents	   can	   be	  transformed	   into	   a	   relationship	   between	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   'principals'	   and	   a	   multiplicity	   of	  agents34.	  Hence	  the	  suggestions,	  offered	  by	  Schumpeter's	  monetary	  theory,	  are	  important	  not	  only	  from	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  analysis	  point	  of	  view	  but	  also	  as	  regards	  to	  the	  problems	  unsolved	  in	  the	  modern	  monetary	  theory.	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